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LITHUANIAN  RECOGNITION 


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LITHUANIAN  RECOGNITION 


ADVOCATED  BY 


HON.  WILLIAM  G.  McADOO 
DR.  HERBERT  ADAMS  GIBBONS 
HON.  WALTER  M.  CHANDLER 


UTHUANIAN  INFORMATION  BUREAU 

1925  F  STREET  NORTHWEST 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 


La(cL5 


CONTENTS 

Page 

Map  of  Lithuania  and  the  Baltic  States v 

Introduction vii 

Letter  of  McAdoo,  Cotton  and  Franklin  to  Secretary  of  State  Colby .  1 

Memorandum  to  Secretary  of  State  in  behalf  of  Recognition  of 

Lithuania  from  McAdoo,  Cotton  and  Franklin 6 

Note  extending  recognition  to  Lithuania  by  Great  Britain 16 

Note  extending  recognition  to  Lithuania  by  France 17 

Note  extending  recognition  to  Lithuania  by  Finland 18 

Note  extending  recognition  to  Lithuania  by  Latvia 19 

Note  extending  recognition  to  Lithuania  by  Norway 20 

Note  extending  recognition  to  Lithuania  by  Poland 21 

Note  extending  recognition  to  Lithuania  by  Sweden 22 

Note  extending  recognition  to  Lithuania  by  Argentina 23 

Note  extending  recognition  to  Lithuania  by  Mexico 24 

Recognition  of  Lithuania  by  Russia ' 25 

Letter  of  Hon.  William  G.  McAdoo  to  Secretary  of  State  Hughes. .  26 

Economic  Basis  for  Lithuania's  Claim  to  Independence 28 

Lithuania,  the  United  States  and  the  League  of  Nations.  By  Herbert 

Adams  Gibbons  35 

Plea  of  Hon.  Walter  M.  Chandler  for  Recognition  of  Lithuania, 

Latavia  and  Esthonia 51 


778987 


MAP  OF  LITHUANIA  AND  THE  BALTIC  STATES 

The  map  on  the  opposite  page  has  been  prepared  by  the  Lithuanian 
Information  Bureau  from  the  most  recent  data  available. 

The  solid  black  lines  represent  the  boundary  agreements  reached 
by  treaties  with  Soviet  Russia  and  correspond  practically  with  the 
ethnographic  limits  of  the  Lithuanian,  Lettish  and  Esthonian  peoples. 

The  heavy  broken  line  shows  the  eastern  boundary  of  Poland  as 
fixed  by  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Allies — the  so-called  "Curzon-Polk 
line" — which  also  approximates  the  ethnographic  boundary  of  Poland 
on  the  east.  With  this  should  be  compared  the  new  eastern  boundary 
of  Poland  established  by  Poland's  Treaty  with  Soviet  Russia,  which 
leaves  a  Polish  corridor,  or  "panhandle"  extending  for  hundreds  of 
miles  beyond  ethnographic  Poland  and  completely  separating  Lithuania 
from  Russia. 

The  break  in  the  solid  black  line  on  the  southern  boundary  of 
Lithuania  indicates  the  only  region  where,  for  a  distance  of  about 
twenty-flve  miles,  ethnographic  Poland  and  ethnographic  Lithuania 
are  in  direct  contact.  The  boundary  here  remains  to  be  settled  by  nego- 
tiation between  Poland  and  Lithuania. 

The  Memel  strip,  bounded  on  the  south  by  the  River  Niemen 
(Nemunas)  and  on  the  north  and  east  by  the  old  German  frontier  (in- 
dicated by  a  light  broken  line)  was  separated  from  Germany  by  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles.  It  is  expected  to  go  to  Lithuania,  ultimately,  but 
is  at  present  administered  under  French  military  occupation.  It  con- 
tains Lithuania's  only  seaport — Memel. 

In  the  spelling  of  names  the  Lithuanian  language  has  been  pre- 
ferred, but  for  certain  important  places,  whose  Lithuanian  names  are 
unknown  to  the  American  reader,  the  familiar  spelling  has  been  given, 
e.  g.,  Kovno,  Memel,  Reval,  etc. 

The  light  broken  lines  in  Lithuania  and  surrounding  territory  indi- 
cate boundaries  of  former  Russian  provinces. 


RerERENce 


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Eastern  Po/is/i  boundary 
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Peace  Treaty. 


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INTRODUCTION 

In  this  little  book  the  Lithuanian  Information  Bureau  has  assembled 
the  opinions  and  arguments  of  some  prominent  Americans  on  the  ques- 
tion of  recognition  of  Lithuania  and  the  Baltic  States. 

I    I 

The  letters  and  brief  of  Hon.  William  G.  McAdoo  were  submitted 
to  the  State  Department  during  the  winter  and  spring  of  1921.  Mr. 
McAdoo  deals  with  the  Lithuanian  case  as  a  lawyer  and  statesman 
presenting  the  arguments  for  recognition  in  systematic  and  formal  fash- 
ion. Readers  of  legal  training  will  appreciate  the  straightforward,  un- 
sentimental logic  of  his  presentation. 

Dr.  Herbert  Adams  Gibbons,  well-known  as  a  writer  on  interna- 
tional affairs,  presents  the  situation  of  Lithuania  and  the  Baltic  States 
as  fraught  with  dangers  to  world  peace  so  long  as  the  status  of  these 
countries  remains  unsettled.  He  points  out  the  inconsistency  and  weak- 
ness of  the  policy  of  the  United  States  Government  toward  Lithuania 
under  the  Wilson  Administration  and  appeals  to  the  Anglo-Saxon 
instinct  of  fair  play  to  "give  the  Baltic  Republics  a  chance." 

I    f 

Hon.  Walter  M.  Chandler,  Member  of  Congress  from  the  City  of 
New  York,  speaks  as  a  warm  friend  of  the  Baltic  States,  acquainted  by 
personal  observation,  during  two  visits  to  these  countries,  with  their 
people,  their  governments  and  their  economic  situation.  He  also  sets 
forth  as  a  trained  advocate  the  legal  and  political  arguments  for  the 
recognition  of  Lithuania,  Latvia  and  Esthonia,  which  he  has  laid  be- 
fore the  Department  of  State.  His  treatment  of  the  subject  is  compre- 
hensive, lucid  and  forcible. 

If 

A  memorandum  on  the  economic  bases  of  Lithuania's  claim  for 
recognition,  prepared  by  the  Lithuanian  Information  Bureau,  has  been 
included  in  the  booklet,  following  the  brief  of  Mr.  McAdoo,     This  mem- 


orandum  has  also  been  presented  to  the  State  Department.  It  aims 
to  prove  that  Lithuania  is  entirely  capable  of  economic  self-support, 
that  she  is  in  fact  relatively  prosperous,  being  an  agricultural  country 
which  has  shown  wonderful  powers  of  recuperation  from  the  devasta- 
tions of  war,  as  indicated  by  her  production  of  crops  and  live  stock, 
and  that  she  needs  only  a  secure  political  status  in  order  to  develop 
a  thrifty  and  prosperous  trade. 

?    I 

The  reader  should  note  that  the  political  situation  has  changed, 
both  in  Europe  and  the  United  States,  since  portions  of  this  book  were 
written.  The  League  of  Nations  has  abandoned  the  scheme  of  a  plebis- 
cite to  determine  the  fate  of  Vilna,  Lithuania's  capital,  and  this  ques- 
tion, as  well  as  other  matters  of  dispute  between  Lithuania  and  Poland, 
are  being  discussed  by  a  Lithuanian-Polish  Commission  at  Brussels, 
at  the  moment  when  this  booklet  goes  to  the  press.  The  settlement 
of  the  German  reparations  question,  the  prospect  of  immediate  restora- 
tion of  direct  relations  between  Germany  and  the  United  States,  through 
the  establishment  of  definite  peace,  the  renewed  participation  of  the 
United  States  in  the  deliberations  of  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  Allies, 
all  point  toward  increased  stability  in  international  relations.  Some 
plan  of  concerted  action  between  America  and  Europe  toward  the  Baltic 
States  must  soon  be  reached.  Latvia  and  Esthonia  have  already  been 
recognized  de  jure  by  the  Allies,  and  Lithuania  has  received  the  promise 
of  like  recognition  in  the  immediate  future.  It  is  not  believed  that  the 
United  States  can  afford  to  take  a  radically  different  standpoint.  Recog- 
nition of  the  independence  of  Lithuania,  Latvia  and  Esthonia  must 
surely  come,  but  it  will  come  more  quickly  and  be  therefore  the  more 
valuable  if  friends  of  these  young  republics — and  we  are  confident  that 
this  means  all  fair-minded  and  informed  Americans — will  take  an 
active  interest  in  the  matter  and  urge  recognition  upon  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  by  every  proper  means. 

LITHUANIAN  INFORMATION  BUREAU. 

Washington,  May  30,  1921, 


LETTER  TO  HONORABLE  BAINBRIDGE  COLBY, 

SECRETARY  OF  STATE,  FROM  McADOO, 

COTTON  AND  FRANKLIN 


Re :  Recognition  of  Lithuanian  Independence 

February  15, 1921. 
Dear  Sir: 

In  submitting  herewith  a  separate  memorandum  on  behalf  of  the 
Lithuanian  Government  in  support  of  recognition  by  the  United  States, 
we  respectfully  invite  your  particular  attention  to  the  more  important 
considerations  applicable  to  the  situation. 

Traditional  Policy  of  United  States. 

The  United  States  Government  is  traditionally  sympathetic  with 
the  national  aspirations  of  dependent  peoples,  a  policy  which  has 
been  emphasized  by  the  expressions  of  the  President  during  the  late 
war.    In  the  words  of  President  Wilson,  uttered  on  February  11,  1918 : 

"Self-determination  is  not  a  mere  phrase.  It  is  an  imper- 
ative principle  of  action  which  statesmen  will  henceforth  ignore 
at  their  peril.  Every  territorial  settlement  involved  in  this  war 
must  be  made  in  the  interest  and  for  the  benefit  of  the  populace 
concerned,  and  not  as  a  part  of  any  mere  adjustment  or  com- 
promise of  claims  among  rival  states." 

Our  "Russian  Policy." 

Apparently  the  main  reason  for  the  failure  of  this  Government  to 
apply  these  principles  in  favor  of  the  recognition  of  Lithuania  is  con- 
tained in  the  statement  of  "our  Russian  policy"  as  announced  in  the 
Avezzana  Note  of  August  10,  1920,  and  as  reaflirmed  in  the  Note  on 
Armenia  to  Paul  Hymans,  President  of  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  dated  January  22,  1921.  This  policy  is  against  the  dismember- 
ment of  Russia,  without  the  consent  of  the  "old  Russia,  restored  free 
and  united." 


As  directly  applied  to  the  question  of  Lithuanian  recognition,  the 
State  Department  in  a  communication  dated  August  23,  1920,  to  Hon. 
Jonas  Vileisis,  Representative  of  Lithuania  in  America,  stated: 

"Russia — the  Russia  of  1917 — must  herself  be  a  party  to 
any  readjustment  of  her  frontiers." 

The  desirability  of  securing  the  consent,  if  possible,  of  free  and 
independent  Russia  to  the  readjustments  of  her  former  frontiers  may 
be  conceded.  We  firmly  urge,  however,  that  our  hope  for  the  restoration 
of  a  free  Russia  in  the  indefinite  future  should  not  be  set  up  as  an 
obstacle  to  the  national  aspirations  of  independent  non-Russian  peoples. 
To  insist  on  the  status  quo  until  Russia  shall  emerge  from  her  troubles 
would  result  in  visiting  upon  the  non-Russian  border  nations  the  mis- 
fortunes now  attendant  upon  the  great  Russian  nation. 

Lithuanians  Entirely  Distinct  from  Russians. 

In  our  natural  reluctance  to  allow  any  selfish  advantage  to  be  taken 
of  present  chaotic  conditions  in  Russia,  to  the  prejudice  of  the  Russian 
people,  the  significant  fact  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the  Lithuanian 
people  are  in  every  way,  by  race,  language,  and  religion,  distinct  from 
the  Russian  people,  and  have  never  willingly  submitted  to  Russian 
rule  in  the  past,  nor  will  they  willingly  submit  in  the  future.  Prior  to 
the  Nineteenth  Century  Lithuania  flourished  as  a  free  and  independent 
nation,  and  was  forcibly  annexed  to  Russia  at  the  close  of  the  Eighteenth 
Century  through  the  right  of  conquest  alone.  In  spite  of  the  most  pro- 
nounced oppression,  the  Lithuanian  people  were  able  to  preserve  their 
independence  of  thought,  religion,  and  custom,  never  ceasing  to  look 
forward  to  the  day  when  Lithuania,  herself  "restored,  free  and  united," 
would  again  take  her  place  among  the  nations  of  the  world.  Several 
unsuccessful  uprisings  took  place,  and  finally  on  February  16,  1918, 
almost  exactly  three  years  ago,  Lithuania  proclaimed  herself  free  and 
independent  of  all  existing  ties  with  other  foreign  powers,  including,  of 
course,  former  Russian  dominion.  Since  that  date  she  has  maintained 
a  democratic  form  of  government  with  increasing  vigor,  successfully 
resisting  the  forces  of  the  Soviet  Government,  until  on  July  12,  1920, 
a  treaty  of  peace  was  concluded,  in  which  the  Soviet  Government 
formally  renounced  all  Russian  claims  to  former  sovereignty  over  the 
Lithuanian  people. 

Other  Nations  Have  Recognized  Lithuania. 

The  independent  Government  of  Lithuania  has  been  recognized 
de  facto  by  the  other  great  nations  of  the  world.  The  United  States 
has  joined  them  in  the  recognition  of  Armenia^  Poland  and  Finland.    As 


to  those  three  nations,  but  not  as  to  Lithuania,  this  Country  has  admitted 
that  our  policy  against  the  dismemberment  of  Russia  should  not  in  all 
fairness  be  applied. 


Non-recognition  Does  Not  Help  Russian  People. 

While  the  present  misfortunes  of  the  Russian  people  are  to  be  de- 
plored, it  must  nevertheless  be  remembered  that  the  failure  to  recognize 
the  independence  of  Lithuania  has  the  effect,  not  of  assisting  the  Russian 
people,  but  of  throwing  the  Lithuanian  people  back  into  Russia,  for 
the  present  at  least,  under  Soviet  control.  This  Government  has  con- 
sistently held  to  the  belief  that  the  Soviet  Government  must  and  \vill 
be  overthrown.  Any  efforts  by  separate  groups  to  throw  off  Soviet  rule 
should,  therefore,  be  encouraged.  Lithuania  has  taken  an  important 
step  in  this  direction,  and  should  be  given  evei-y  encouragement  to 
maintain  her  existing  democratic  form  of  Government,  rather  than 
relegated  to  her  former  condition  as  part  of  Russia,  with  consequent 
oppression  from  the  only  ruling  power  in  Russia  today. 

There  are  other  considerations,  apart  from  the  question  of  our 
Russian  policy,  in  support  of  Lithuania's  claim  for  recognition,  which 
are  treated  in  our  separate  memorandum.  Without  attempting  here  to 
discuss  them  all,  we  respectfully  invite  attention  to  two  of  the  more 
important  existing  problems,  which  recognition  of  Lithuania  by  the 
United  States  will  tend  greatly  to  simplify. 


1.    THE  POUSH  SITUATION. 

The  presence  of  Polish  troops  on  Lithuanian  soil  constitutes  a  grave 
menace  to  the  peace  of  Central  Europe.  By  the  terms  of  her  Peace 
Treaty  with  Lithuania,  Soviet  Russia  agreed  to  respect  the  neutrality  of 
Lithuanian  territory  so  long  as  other  nations  similarly  respected  it.  The 
presence  of  Polish  troops  on  Lithuanian  soil  is  a  violation  of  this  Treaty, 
involving  the  danger  of  an  invasion  of  Lithuania  by  Russian  troops 
which  are  already  massed  on  the  Lithuanian  frontier  for  that  purpose. 
Lithuania  must  be  considered  either  as  an  independent  nation  or  as 
part  of  Russia;  no  middle  ground  is  possible.  If  she  is  part  of  Russia, 
Poland  being  at  war  with  Russia,  logically  must  be  conceded  the  right 
to  invade  her  territory.  This  in  turn  affords  Russia  the  justification  for 
a  counter-invasion  of  Lithuania  against  the  Poles.  The  danger  of  such 
a  general  embroilment  of  these  nations  cannot  be  too  strongly  empha- 
sized. Even  if  a  Peace  Treaty  should  be  signed  at  Riga,  between  Poland 
and  Russia  (which  seems  unlikely)  Poland  might  still  have  to  invade 
Lithuanian  territory  for  strategic  reasons. 


Recognition  Would  Prevent  War. 

If  Lithuania  should  be  recognized  by  the  United  States,  as  an  inde- 
pendent Nation,  with  consequent  admission  into  the  League  of  Nations 
and  guarantees  of  territorial  integrity,  Poland  would  be  obliged  to  with- 
draw her  troops  and  could,  from  her  own  standpoint,  safely  afford  to 
do  so.  Russia  would  then  have  no  claim  that  Lithuania  was  allowing 
hostile  troops  upon  her  soil,  the  danger  of  Russian  invasion  would  be 
largely  averted,  and  in  all  likelihood  a  solution  of  this  grave  problem 
would  thus  be  found. 


2.    THE  PROPOSED  PLEBISCITE. 

The  League  of  Nations  is  planning  to  hold  a  plebiscite  in  important 
localities  in  the  eastern  and  southeastern  portions  of  Lithuania,  to 
determine  whether  these  localities  prefer  to  attach  themselves  to  Poland 
or  to  Lithuania.  It  is  obvious  that  the  question  cannot  be  fairly  pre- 
sented without  the  recognition  of  Lithuania  on  an  equal  footing  with 
Poland.  As  the  situation  now  stands,  the  question  to  be  put  to  the  voters 
would  be  in  effect,  "do  you  prefer  to  belong  to  a  free  and  independent 
Poland  or  to  attach  yourselves  to  Lithuania,  to  be  held  in  trust  for 
Russia,  with  no  guarantee  of  independence?"  The  grave  injustice  to 
Lithuania  of  a  plebiscite  on  these  terms  is  clear.  Undoubtedly  many 
districts  ordinarily  sympathetic  with  and  even  part  of  Lithuania,  would 
choose  independence  as  Poles  rather  than  serfdom  as  Russians  under  the 
present  Soviet  control. 

Ruuia's  Rights  Should  Not  Prejudice  Lithuania's. 

The  problems  presented  by  the  readjustment  of  the  Russian  frontiers 
are  concededly  difficult  of  solution.  We  have  no  desire  to  allow  selfish 
advantage  to  be  taken  of  Russia's  present  unfortunate  condition.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  is  respectfully  urged  that  this  chaotic  state  should 
not  prevent  the  recognition  of  the  just  claims  of  independent  non- 
Russian  peoples,  especially  where  the  consequence  of  withholding 
recognition  involves  the  subjection  of  such  peoples  to  Soviet  rule  and 
where  extending  recognition  offers  the  only  rational  solution  of  many 
problems  involved  in  the  Baltic  situation. 

Third  Anniversary  of  Lithuanian  Independence. 

On  February  16,  1921,  will  occur  the  third  anniversary  of  the  Proc- 
lamation of  Independence  by  Lithuania.  During  this  time  its  govern- 
ment has  maintained  itself,  in  the  face  of  most  unfavorable  conditions, 
with  increasing  control  and  power.    This  anniversary  would  seem  to 


5 

afford  a  suitable  occasion  for  the  United  States  to  express,  in  the 
tangible  form  of  recognition,  its  sjonpathy  with  the  national  aspirations 
of  the  Lithuanian  people  for  independence. 

Yours  respectfully, 

McAdoo,  Cotton  &  Franklin. 
Hon.  Bainbridge  Colby, 
Secretary  of  State, 
Washington,  D.  C. 


MEMORANDUM  TO  THE  SECRETARY  OF  STATE 

IN  BEHALF  OF  RECOGNITION  OF 

LITHUANIAN  INDEPENDENCE 

From  McAdoo,  Cotton  and  Franklin 

Supplementing  the  memorandum  dated  January  15, 1921,  submitted 
by  us  to  Hon.  Norman  H.  Davis,  Acting  Secretary  of  State,  on  that  date, 
we  are  setting  forth  below  some  of  the  more  important  considerations 
which  apply  to  the  claim  of  the  Lithuanian  Government  for  recognition 
by  the  United  States. 

I.    SYMPATHY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES    WITH    NATIONAL 
ASPIRATIONS  OF  DEPENDENT  PEOPLES. 

This  principle  was  expressed  at  an  early  date  in  the  history  of  our 
political  relations  by  Secretary  of  State  Buchanan  as  follows: 

"The  Government  of  the  United  States  has  from  its  origin 
always  recognized  de  facto  governments  as  soon  as  they  have 
clearly  manifested  their  ability  to  maintain  their  independence." 
(See  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  page  113.) 

This  policy  has  been  stated  on  numerous  occasions  by  President 
Wilson  since  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War.  The  following  declara- 
tion on  February  11,  1918,  is  typical  of  many  others: 

"Self-determination  is  not  a  mere  phrase.  It  is  an  imper- 
ative principle  of  action  which  statesmen  will  henceforth 
ignore  at  their  peril.  Every  territorial  settlement  involved  in 
this  war  must  be  made  in  the  interest  and  for  the  benefit  of  the 
populations  concerned,  and  not  as  a  part  of  any  mere  adjust- 
ment of  compromise  of  claims  among  rival  states." 

These  principles  have  been  directly  applied  in  expressions  toward 
Lithuania  by  Secretary  of  State  Lansing  in  a  communication  to  the 
Lithuanian  National  Council,  dated  October  15,  1919: 

"The  Government  of  the  United  States  is  traditionally 
sympathetic  with  the  national  aspirations  of  independent 
peoples." 

Unless  these  principles  must  be  considered  to  be  modified  by  "our 
Russian  policy,"  the  claims  of  Lithuania  would  seem  to  properly  fall 
within  the  principles  of  self-determination. 


II.    SUMMARY  OF  OUR  RUSSIAN  POLICY. 

On  May  26,  1919,  a  note  was  sent  to  Admiral  Kolchak  signed  by 
Clemenceau,  Lloyd  George,  Orlando,  President  Wilson  and  Saionji, 
setting  forth  the  policy  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  toward 
Russia.  In  this  note  the  policy  was  declared  formally  to  restore  order 
within  Russia  by  enabling  the  Russian  people  to  resume  control  of  their 
own  affairs,  and  to  restore  order  along  its  frontiers  by  arranging  for  the 
settlement  of  disputes  in  regard  to  the  boundaries  of  the  Russian  state 
with  its  neighbors  through  the  arbitration  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
Feeling  convinced  that  these  ends  could  not  be  attained  by  dealing  with 
the  Soviet  Government,  they  set  forth  certain  conditions  which  thej' 
would  expect  Admiral  Kolchak  to  observe  if  he  should  prove  sufficiently 
powerful  to  dominate  conditions  in  Russia.  Among  these  conditions 
the  following  were  stated : 

"Fourthly:  That  the  independence  of  Finland  and  Poland 
be  recognized,  and  that  in  the  event  of  the  frontiers  and  other 
relations  between  Russia  and  these  countries  not  being  settled 
by  agreement  they  will  be  referred  to  the  arbitration  of  the 
League  of  Nations. 

Fifthly:  That  if  solution  of  the  relations  between  the  de 
facto  Governments  of  Esthonia,  Latvia,  Lithuania  and  the 
Caucasian  and  Transcaucasian  territories,  and  Russia,  is  not 
speedily  restored  by  agreement,  the  settlement  will  be  made 
in  consultation  and  co-operation  with  the  League  of  Nations, 
and  that  until  such  settlement  is  made  the  Government  of 
Russia  agrees  to  recognize  these  territories  as  autonomous  and 
to  confirm  the  relations  which  may  exist  between  the  de  facto 
governments  and  the  Allied  and  Associated  governments. 

Sixthly:  That  the  right  of  the  Peace  Conference  to  deter- 
mine the  future  of  the  Roumanian  part  of  Bessarabia  be 
recognized." 

Secretary  Lansing's  Policy. 

The  next  statement  of  importance  as  applied  to  the  status  of  Lithu- 
ania is  contained  in  a  communication  to  the  Lithuanian  National  Council 
represented  by  M.  J.  Vinikas,  Chairman,  signed  by  Hon.  Robert  Lansing, 
dated  October  15,  1919.  In  this  communication.  Secretary  Lansing, 
answering  the  letters  of  the  Lithuanian  National  Council  on  the  subject 
of  the  provisional  recognition  of  Lithuania,  stated : 

"The  question  of  the  future  status  of  Lithuania  has  been 
given  careful  consideration.  As  you  are  aware,  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  is  traditionally  sympathetic  with  the 
national  aspirations  of  dependent  peoples.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  has  been  thought  unwise  and  unfair  to  prejudice  in  advance 
of  the  establishment  of  orderly  constitutional  government  in 
Russia  the  principle  of  Russian  unity  as  a  whole. 


s 

Secretary  Lansing  then  referred  to  the  note  to  Admiral  Kolchak 
mentioned  above  and  stated : 

"It  is  believed  that  this  arrangement  assures  the  autono- 
mous development  of  Lithuania,  together  with  the  other  nation- 
alities comprised  within  the  former  Russian  empire,  and  wisely 
refers  to  a  future  adjustment  the  determination  of  the  relations 
which  shall  exist  between  them  and  the  new  Russian  Govern- 
ment." 

Secretary  Colby's  Policy. 

The  next  communication  of  importance  on  the  question  is  the 
so-called  Avezzana  note  of  Secretary  Colby,  dated  August  10, 1920.  This 
note  declared  that  the  policy  of  the  United  States  was  against  the  recog- 
nition of  the  Bolshevist  regime  and  a  settlement  of  the  Russian  problem 
"upon  the  basis  of  a  dismemberment  of  Russia."  The  Secretary  after 
referring  to  the  sincere  friendship  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
for  the  great  Russian  nation  struggling  for  self-government,  expressed 
the  confidence  of  the  United  States  that — 

"restored,  free  and  united,  Russia  will  again  take  a  leading 

Elace  in  the  world,  joining  with  the  other  free  nations  in  up- 
olding  peace  and  orderly  protection." 

The  Secretary  then  stated: 

"Until  that  time  shall  arrive,  the  United  States  feels  that 
friendship  and  honor  require  that  Russia's  interests  must  be 
generously  protected,  and  that  as  far  as  possible  all  decisions 
of  vital  importance  to  it,  and  especially  those  concerning  its 
sovereignty  over  the  territory  of  the  former  Russian  empire, 
be  held  in  abeyance.  By  this  feeling  of  friendship  and  honor- 
able obligation  to  the  great  nation  whose  brave  and  heroic  self- 
sacrifice  contributed  so  much  to  the  successful  determination 
of  the  war,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  was  guided  in 
its  reply  to  the  Lithuanian  National  Council  on  October  15, 1919, 
and  m  its  persistent  refusal  to  recognize  the  Baltic  States  as 
separate  nations  independent  of  Russia.  The  same  spirit  was 
manifested  in  the  note  of  this  Government  of  March  24,  1920, 
in  which  it  was  stated  with  reference  to  certain  proposed  settle- 
ments in  the  Near  East  that  'no  final  decision  should  or  can 
be  made  without  the  consent  of  Russia.' " 

Acting  Secretary  .Davis'  Statement. 

The  final  communication  of  importance  is  dated  August  23,  1920, 
from  Hon.  Norman  H.  Davis,  Acting  Secretary  of  State,  to  Hon.  Jonas 
Vileisis.  In  this  communication  Secretary  Davis  stated  that  the  Depart- 
ment saw  no  reason  to  modify  its  policy  with  respect  to  withholding 
recognition  from  Lithuania.    The  communication  then  stated : 


9 

"However,  some  comments  have  appeared  in  the  public 
press  which  interpret  this  statement  of  friendly  purpose  toward 
Russia  as  a  rebufl  to  the  non-Russian  peoples  along  the  border 
who  aspire  to  a  fuller  and  freer  national  life. 

"This  Government  has  held  consistently  to  the  belief  that 
Russia — the  Russia  of  1917 — must  herself  be  a  party  to  any 
readjustment  of  her  frontier.  The  American  people  sympathize 
with  the  desire  of  the  non-Russian  people  along  the  border 
for  the  largest  possible  measure  of  self-government,  but  it 
believes  that  any  attempt  to  reach  a  permanent  settlement  of 
the  complicated  problems  involved  without  the  consultation  and 
cordial  consent  of  a  government  generally  recognized  as  repre- 
senting the  great  Russian  people,  will  "be  futile.  Unless  all 
parties  in  interest  can  reach  an  amicable  agreement  among 
themselves  there  is  no  hope  for  permanent  tranquillity." 

From  the  above  summary  it  is  evident  that  the  United  States  was 
not  disposed  to  recognize  Lithuania's  independence  in  August,  1920, 
primarily  because  such  recognition  would  involve,  in  the  opinion  of  the 
Department,  a  departure  from  its  "Russian  policy." 

Reconsideration  Now  Needed. 

It  is  believed  that  since  the  date  of  the  last  communication  men- 
tioned above,  August  23,  1920,  there  have  been,  among  others,  six 
important  changes  in  existing  conditions  since  that  date,  which  would 
justify  the  United  States  in  reconsidering  the  application  of  the  Russian 
policy  insofar  as  it  affects  the  failure  to  recognize  the  independence  of 
Lithuania.  There  will  also  be  considered  hereafter  the  more  important 
reasons  in  support  of  the  recognition  of  Lithuania  at  this  time  by  the 
United  States,  apart  from  changing  conditions. 


III.    IMPORTANT  CHANGES  IN  CONDITIONS 
SINCE  AUGUST  23,  1920. 

Russia's  Restoration  Not  in  Sight. 

(1)  There  is  now  no  hope  of  the  restoration  of  the  Russia  of  1917  by 

Wrangel  or  Denikine. 

Whatever  hope  may  have  existed  last  summer  that  the  Bolshevist 
regime  would  be  overthrown  and  that  the  old  Russia  of  1917  would  take 
its  place  through  some  tangible  insurgent  forces,  no  longer  exists.  At 
that  time  the  forces  of  Wrangel  and  Denikine  were  a  real  factor  in  the 
situation.  Kolchak  had  but  recently  been  eliminated.  It  may  well  be 
that  it  would  be  preferable  for  a  free  and  non-Bolshevic  Russia  to  be- 
come a  party  to  the  adjustment  of  its  former  frontiers,  but  the  elimin- 
ation since  last  summer  of  all  opposing  forces  by  the  Bolshevic  regime 


10 

presents  an  impasse,  if  our  policy  as  then  stated  is  to  be  continued 
without  modification. 

Peace  With  RuMia. 

(2)  The  terms  of  the  Peace  Treaty  between  Lithuania  and  Soviet  Russia, 
concluded  July  12,  1920,  have  now  become  known. 

Details  of  this  treaty  had  not  been  received  in  this  country  at  the 
time  of  the  communication  to  Mr.  Vileisis  of  August  23,  1920.  By  the 
terms  of  that  treaty  Soviet  Russia  has  completely  recognized  the  inde- 
pendence of  Lithuania  and  renounced  all  claims  to  former  sovereignty. 
It  may  well  be  logically  that  as  the  United  States  has  not  recognized  the 
Bolshevic  regime,  it  is  not  concluded  by  the  provisions  of  this  treaty. 
Conceding  the  logic  of  this  situation,  it  nevertheless  is  undeniable  that 
the  only  authoritative  government  in  Russia  has  completely  renounced 
all  claims  to  Lithuania.  The  importance  of  this  action,  insofar  as  the 
rights  of  Lithuania  are  defined  thereby,  should  be  carefully  weighed 
independently  of  the  refusal  of  the  United  States  to  recognize  the  Soviet 
Government  of  Russia. 

Lithuania  Not  Admitted  to  League. 

(3)  The  League  of  Nations  has  refused  membership  to  Lithuania. 

The  request  of  Lithuania  for  admission  to  the  League  of  Nations 
was  refused  last  autumn  primarily  because  the  United  States  had  not 
recognized  the  independence  of  Lithuania.  Although  this  country  is 
not  at  present  a  member  of  the  League  of  Nations,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  League  is  unwilling  to  take  any  action  opposed  to  our  expressed 
policies  and  the  League  in  its  rejection  of  Lithuania  as  a  member  laid 
great  stress  upon  the  refusal  of  the  United  States  to  recognize  its  inde- 
pendence. It  is  sufficient  merely  to  state  this  circumstance,  the  impor- 
tance of  which  to  Lithuanian  aspirations  is  evident. 

Zeligowski's  Seizure  of  Vilna. 

(4)  The  Polish  situation. 

The  details  of  the  grave  problem  presented  by  the  presence  of  Polish 
troops  on  Lithuanian  soil  are  too  well  known  to  require  extended  dis- 
cussion. The  entire  region  around  Vilna,  the  former  capital  of  Lithu- 
ania, has  been  occupied  by  Polish  troops  under  the  command  of 
Zeligowski.  While  Poland  has  disavowed  responsibility  for  his  actions, 
it  is  nevertheless  a  recognized  fact  that  Poland  is  supplying  him  with 
fresh  troops  and  materials  of  war,  and  that  in  adopting  these  measures 
she  is  acting  largely  for  her  own  protection  against  Russia.    A  state  of 


11 

war  still  exists  between  Poland  and  Russia,  and  Lithuania  is  in  the 
unfortunate  position  geographically  of  the  national  "no  man's  land" 
between  the  warring  countries.  Under  the  present  attitude  of  the  United 
States,  Lithuanian  territory  must  be  regarded  as  held  in  trust  for  Russia 
and  Poland  is  therefore  logically  within  her  rights  in  occupying  Lithu- 
anian (Russian)  territory.  The  situation  is  further  complicated  by  the 
provisions  in  the  treaty  between  Lithuania  and  Russia  to  the  effect  that 
Russia  is  only  bound  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Lithuania  so  long  as 
troops  hostile  to  Russia  similarly  respect  it.  Accordingly,  the  presence 
of  Polish  troops  on  Lithuanian  territory  ipso  facto  constitutes  a  violation 
of  Lithuania's  treaty  with  Russia  and  gives  Russia  the  right  to  undertake 
similar  invasion.  This  is  not  merely  a  bogie  dangled  by  Lithuania  before 
the  eyes  of  the  world  to  hasten  its  own  recognition.  The  presence  of 
large  forces  of  Russian  troops  massed  upon  the  Lithuanian  border  and 
the  probability  of  an  invasion  of  Lithuania  against  Poland  by  these 
troops  has  been  reported  in  detail  recently  in  the  public  press.  The 
whole  situation  presents  a  grave  danger  which  it  is  distinctly  to  the 
interests  of  the  world  at  large  should  be  unraveled.  The  solution  can 
be  found  as  a  logical  consequence  of  the  recognition  by  the  United  States 
of  Lithuania.  If  this  recognition  were  granted  with  consequent  admis- 
sion to  membership  in  the  League  of  Nations,  Lithuanian  independence 
would  immediately  become  a  safeguard  to  Poland  against  Russia. 
Poland  would  then  not  have  the  excuse  that  Lithuania  is  part  of  Russia 
and  subject  to  invasion.  Upon  the  withdrawal  of  the  Polish  troops 
from  Lithuania  the  danger  of  invasion  from  Russia  would  no  longer 
exist.  The  Russian  authorities  have  strongly  asserted  that  they  will 
respect  the  treaty  with  Lithuania  so  long  as  other  nations  respect  it, 
and  there  would  be  no  justification  under  the  treaty  for  the  invasion  of 
Lithuania  by  Russia  when  the  Polish  troops  are  withdrawn. 

Note  to  M.  Hymans. 

Moreover,  recognition  of  Lithuania  would  not  seem  to  be  incon- 
sistent with  the  expressions  contained  in  the  recent  note  to  Paul  Hymans, 
President  of  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations,  dated  January  22, 
1921,  with  respect  to  the  mandate  of  Armenia.  In  this  note,  Hon.  Norman 
H.  Davis,  speaking  for  the  President,  said : 

"The  unrest  and  instability  along  the  border  are  caused  by 
bitter  and  mutual  distrust.  The  struggling  new  nationalities 
which  were  formerly  part  of  the  Russian  empire  are  afraid  to 
disarm  and  return  to  tne  works  of  peace,  because  they  distrust 
the  Bolsheviki  and  fear  new  aggression.  The  Soviets  contend 
that  they  are  afraid  to  demobilize  because  they  fear  new 
attack." 


12 

The  note  then  urges  the  Associated  Powers  to  give  no  encouragement 
for  the  invasion  of  Russian  territory  by  such  border  states.  In  this  note 
attention  also  is  called  to  "the  recent  tragical  events  on  the  Polish 
front." 


Polish  Invasion  of  Lithuania. 

There  is  certainly  no  disposition  on  the  part  of  Lithuania  to  under- 
take an  invasion  of  Russia.  On  the  contrary,  this  action  has  been  ex- 
pressly negatived  by  the  treaty  of  peace  between  the  two  nations  con- 
cluded last  July.  It  is  the  presence  of  Polish  troops  under  General 
Zeligowski  on  Lithuanian  territory  which  is  largely  responsible  for  the 
grave  problem  presented  by  the  Baltic  situation.  Not  only  would  the 
danger  of  the  invasion  of  Russia  by  Poland  be  obviated  by  the  recog- 
nition of  Lithuania  by  the  United  States,  but  also  the  consequent  danger 
of  invasion  of  Lithuania  by  Russia  would  disappear  with  the  withdrawal 
of  the  Polish  troops.  The  guaranty  to  Russia  as  expressed  in  the  note, 
"You  can  have  peace  if  you  want  it,"  can,  it  is  submitted,  best  be  made 
by  the  recognition  of  Lithuania  with  the  consequent  withdrawal  of 
Polish  troops  from  Lithuanian  (Russian)  territory.  This  would  not 
only  remove  Russia's  reason  to  fear  hostilities  with  Poland,  but  also 
Russia's  excuse  for  invading  Lithuania.  If  there  are  thereafter  hostili- 
ties, in  the  language  of  this  note  the  responsibility  "would  then  be  clearly 
placed." 

Even  if  the  negotiations  between  Poland  and  Soviet  Russia  at  Riga 
should  result  in  a  treaty  of  peace  (which  according  to  the  latest  advices 
seems  unlikely) ,  the  situation  would  not  be  greatly  altered.  The  Soviet 
authorities  have  repeatedly  declared  that  if  they  are  obliged  to  sign 
the  Riga  treaty,  it  will  be  regarded  as  founded  on  coercion  and  will 
be  nullified  as  soon  as  their  forces  have  had  an  opportunity  to  be 
strengthened  and  co-ordinated. 


Polish  Corridor  Into  Russia. 

Moreover,  in  any  event,  the  status  of  Lithuania  cannot  be  settled  in 
this  way.  The  territory  to  be  accorded  to  Poland  under  this  treaty 
consists  of  a  narrow  strip  extending  northward  to  the  River  Dvina;  to 
the  westward  of  this  strip  lies  the  territory  of  Lithuania.  Poland,  for 
strategic  reasons,  would  in  all  likelihood  be  obliged  to  occupy  this  terri- 
tory, if  Lithuania  is  not  recognized  as  an  independent  nation.  Soviet 
Russia,  which  has  guaranteed  the  neutrality  of  Lithuania,  would  un- 
doubtedly regard  the  presence  of  Polish  troops  on  Lithuanian  soil  as  a 
violation  of  this  neutrality,  causing  the  same  dangers  of  unrest  and 
instability  as  exist  at  present. 


13 

Plebiscite  in  Vllna  District. 

(a)  The  proposed  plebiscite  under  the  auspices  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

This  situation  was  discussed  in  a  memorandum  submitted  by  the 
Representative  of  Lithuania  to  the  Department  of  State,  dated  December 
21,  1920.  The  importance  of  a  fair  decision  by  the  voters  in  this  im- 
portant locality  of  Vilna  is  apparent.  It  must  be  conceded  that  a  fair 
decision  cannot  be  had  until  the  independence  of  Lithuania  is  recog- 
nized. The  voters  should  not  be  asked  to  decide  whether  they  prefer 
to  attach  themselves  to  Poland  with  consequent  guaranties  of  inde- 
pendence or  whether  they  prefer  to  be  held  in  trust  for  Russia  with  no 
guaranties  of  future  independence.  The  result  of  such  a  proposition 
would  undoubtedly  be  that  Poland  would  obtain  a  large  and  important 
area  of  land  which  is  concededly  Lithuanian  both  ethnologically  and  in 
sympathy. 

Lithuania  Resists  Bolshevism. 

(6)  Danger  of  sovietization  of  Lithuania. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  importance  of  national  recognition  as 
an  antidote  to  soviet  propaganda.  The  countries  of  Armenia  and  Azer- 
baijan have  already  become  entirely  sovietized.  This  result  is  accom- 
plished through  soviet  propaganda  which  is  conducted  along  the  follow- 
ing lines:  "Soviet  Russia  is  fighting  against  the  world  to  sovietize  the 
world;  failure  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  extend  recognition  in- 
dicates a  complete  lack  of  sympathy  with  the  national  aspirations  of  the 
peoples  formerly  under  Russian  rule;  therefore  it  is  better  for  such  peo- 
ples to  throw  in  their  lot  with  Soviet  Russia  which  will  guarantee  autono- 
my and  recognize  their  independence,  provided  a  soviet  form  of  govern- 
ment is  adopted."  So  far  Lithuania  has  resisted  this  propaganda  and  is 
likely  to  continue  to  do  so,  but  in  view  of  the  extreme  importance  of 
Lithuania  geographically  as  a  barrier  against  Bolshevism  between  Soviet 
Russia  and  Central  Europe  any  danger  of  the  sovietization  of  Lithuania 
is  an  important  consideration  and  should  be  counteracted  by  all  possible 
methods. 

IV.    OUR   POLICY   AS   TO   RUSSIA   AS   ANNOUNCED    IN   THE 

AVEZZANA  NOTE  IS  NO  BAR  TO  THE  RECOGNITION 

OF  LITHUANIA. 

(a)  It  must  be  conceded  that  Lithuanians  are  a  non-Russian  people. 
Our  policy  against  the  dismemberment  of  Russia  should  not  be  applied 
as  against  a  people  which  were  identified  with  Russia  only  through  the 
superior  power  of  oppression.    Lithuania  in  the  eighteenth  century  and 


14 

earlier,  was  a  great  independent  nation, — the  powerful  Lithuanian- 
Polish  Republic, — which  was  conquered  by  Russia  and  partitioned  be- 
tween the  three  neighboring  powers,  Russia,  Prussia  and  Austria,  the 
greater  part  of  the  territory  going  to  Russia.  Lithuania  has  never  will- 
ingly submitted  to  Russian  rule.  The  religion  of  Lithuania  is  Roman 
Catholic.  Its  people  are  not  Slavs  but  are  ethnologically  distinct.  Even 
with  the  availability  of  the  presence  of  the  Russia  of  1917,  it  is  submitted 
that  our  policy  would  not  require  Lithuania  to  continue  to  submit  to 
Russian  rule.  In  the  communication  of  August  23,  it  is  stated  that 
Lithuanians  are  a  non-Russian  people  and  it  is  submitted  that  our 
policy  against  dismemberment  of  Russia  should  not  be  applied  against 
a  people  which  is  concededly  non-Russian. 

Recognition  a  Bar  to  Bolshevism. 

(b)  The  underlying  sentiment  of  the  Avezzana  note  recognizes  the 
hope  that  the  people  comprised  within  Russian  territory  will  throw  off 
the  yoke  of  Bolshevism.  This  can  never  be  accomplished  at  one  time 
by  concerted  action  on  the  part  of  such  people.  It  must  take  place 
gradually  here  and  there  throughout  Russia  by  setting  up  democratic 
forms  of  government  with  sufficient  force  to  maintain  themselves  in 
opposition  to  the  Soviet  Government.  In  this  way  the  Russian  people 
will  gi'adually  be  enabled  to  repudiate  the  Soviet  Government.  It  is 
precisely  this  action  which  Lithuania  has  taken.  It  has  set  up  a  demo- 
cratic form  of  government  which  proposes  to  defend  itself  against  en- 
croachment by  Soviet  Russia.  It  has  in  fact  by  arrangement  with  the 
Soviet  Government  forced  the  latter  to  recognize  its  freedom  and  re- 
nounce claims  of  sovereignty.  Its  recognition  by  the  United  States  would 
not  only  be  in  line  with  the  hostile  attitude  of  this  country  towards 
Soviet  Russia  but  would  also  be  a  source  of  much  encouragement  to 
other  groups  of  people  seeking  to  throw  off  Bolshevic  rule. 

V.    UTHUANIA  HAS  BEEN  RECOGNIZED  BY  THE  OTHER  GREAT 
POWERS  AS  A  DE  FACTO  GOVERNMENT. 

While  this  circumstance  is  not  controlling  upon  the  United  States, 
it  should  be  given  due  consideration  in  determining  the  de  facto  exist- 
ence of  Lithuania.  That  its  independence  exists  de  facto  to  an  extent 
which  would  justify  recognition  must  be  conceded.  It  is  likewise  im- 
portant that  other  powers  have  seen  fit  to  recognize  this  independence. 
For  the  information  of  the  Department  there  are  attached  to  this  mem- 
orandum translations  of  the  notes  extending  recognition  to  Lithuania 
by  the  respective  governments  of  (1)  Great  Britain,  (2)  France,  (3) 
Finland,  (4)  Latvia,  (5)  Norway,  (6)  Poland,  (7)  Sweden,  and  (8)  Soviet 
Russia.    Lithuania  has  also  been  recognized  by  Italy. 


15 

Recognition  Would  Settle  Baltic  Problem. 

In  this  memorandum  there  has  been  no  attempt  to  discuss  the 
ethnology  of  the  Lithuanian  people  nor  other  facts  connected  with  the 
location,  resources,  population,  etc.,  of  the  country.  These  conditions 
have  been  fully  explained  in  previous  memoranda  submitted  to  the 
Department  and  their  discussion  here  would  serve  no  useful  purpose. 
This  memorandum  is  submitted  in  the  earnest  conviction  that  the  recog- 
nition of  Lithuania  by  the  United  States  should  be  accorded  not  only 
because  such  recognition  would  be  well  deserved  by  this  independent 
and  democratic  people  but  also  because  it  seems  to  present  a  real  solu- 
tion of  many  of  the  perplexing  problems  presented  by  the  Baltic  situation 
generally. 

Respectfully  submitted, 

McAdoo,  Cotton  &  Franklin, 
120  Broadway,  New  York  City. 

Dated  February  15,  1921. 


16 


COPY  OF  NOTE  EXTENDING  RECOGNITION  TO 
LITHUANIA  BY  GREAT  BRITAIN 

Kaunas,  September  25,  1919. 

Sir: 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  I  have  received  a  telegram 
from  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  by  way  of  Riga,  stating  that  the 
Government  of  His  Majesty  of  Great  Britain  has  communicated  to  the 
Lithuanian  Representatives  that  he  is  ready  to  recognize  the  Provisional 
Government  of  Lithuania  as  an  independent  state  de  facto  on  the  same 
basis  as  the  Nations  of  Esthonia  and  Latvia,  and  I  have  received  orders 
to  communicate  this  information  to  you. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be.  Sir, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

(Signed)  Ward,  Lieut.  Colonel, 
Asst.  Commissary  for  the  Baltic  Provinces. 
To  His  Excellency, 

The  President  of  Lithuania, 
Kaunas. 


17 


TRANSLATION  OF  NOTE  EXTENDING  RECOGNITION  TO 
LITHUANIA  BY  FRANCE 

Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
Political  Division 

Paris,  May  11, 1920, 

Mr.  Minister  : 

You  have  asked  me  several  times  to  define  the  nature  of  the  rela- 
tions existing  between  Lithuania  and  the  Republic  of  France. 

The  French  Government  is  strongly  inclined,  as  you  know,  to  enter 
into  relations  of  understanding  and  friendship  with  the  Provisional 
Government  of  your  country  and  it  has  been  its  pleasure  to  receive, 
with  official  standing,  its  representatives  at  Paris. 

I  am  happy  to  assure  you  that  the  Government  of  this  Republic 
recognizes  provisionally  the  de  facto  Independence  of  Lithuania,  pending 
the  agreement  of  the  Allied  Powers  upon  the  question  of  de  jure 
recognition. 

I  take  this  opportunity  to  express  to  you  the  interest  which  I  take 
in  the  development  of  cordial  relations  between  Lithuania  and  France. 

Accept,  Mr.  Minister,  the  assurance  of  my  high  consideration. 

(Signed)  Millerand. 
To  Mr.  V.  de  Milosz, 

Lithuanian  Minister, 
Paris. 


18 


TRANSLATION  OF  NOTE  EXTENDING  RECOGNITION  TO 
LITHUANIA  BY  FINLAND 

Bureau  of  Foreign  Affairs 

Helsingfors,  Nov.  17,  1919. 
No.  10904. 
To  THE  President  of  the  Council  : 

I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  receipt  of  your  Excellency's  letter 
of  October  23rd  last  by  which  I  was  informed  of  the  desire  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  Lithuania  to  obtain  from  the  Government  of  Finland  recog- 
nition of  the  Independence  of  Lithuania  and  of  its  Provisional  Govern- 
ment 

The  President  of  the  Republic,  who  has  always  been  actuated  by 
the  most  sympathetic  feelings  toward  Lithuania,  has  ordered  me  to 
convey  to  your  Excellency  the  information  that  he  is  happy  to  extend 
recognition  to  the  Government  of  Lithuania  as  Government  de  facto  of 
said  country  and  that  he  extends  the  heartiest  wishes  for  the  prosperity 
of  the  new  Nation  and  for  the  establishment  of  bonds  of  friendship 
between  our  two  countries. 

Please  accept,  Mr.  President  of  the  Council,  the  assurance  of  my 
highest  consideration. 

(Signed)  Holsti. 

To  His  Excellency, 

Mr.  Galvanauskas, 

President  of  the  Council  of 

Lithuania,  etc.,  Kaunas. 


19 


TRANSLATION  OF  NOTE  EXTENDING  RECOGNITION  TO 
LITHUANIA  BY  LATVIA 

Republic  of  Latvia 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 

Riga.  Feb.  12,  1921. 
Nr.  p.  2368. 

Mr.  Minister  : 

I  have  the  honor  to  infonn  you  that,  in  accordance  with  the  will  of 
the  President  of  the  Constituent  Assembly,  the  Cabinet  of  Ministers 
has  decided  to  recognize  Lithuania  de  jure  as  free  and  independent. 

In  sending  on  this  occasion  my  heartiest  good  wishes  to  the  Republic 
of  Lithuania,  permit  me  to  express  my  most  firm  conviction  that  our 
two  peoples  will  be  united  in  even  closer  friendship  in  the  future.  The 
Government  of  Latvia  is  firmly  convinced  that  the  fraternal  Letto- 
Lithuanian  union  constitutes  the  most  solid  basis  for  the  consolidation 
of  the  independence  and  sovereignty  of  our  young  States.  This  friend- 
ship, nourished  by  our  inextinguishable  will  to  live  independently,  will 
permit  us  to  go  forward  in  the  path  of  progress  and  prosperity,  while 
pursuing  our  common  ideals  of  justice  and  true  liberty. 

Accept,  Mr.  Minister,  the  assurance  of  my  highest  consideration. 

(Signed)  Z.  A.  Meierovicz, 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs. 
To  His  Excellency 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Lithuania. 


20 


TRANSLATION  OF  NOTE  EXTENDING  RECOGNITION  TO 
LITHUANIA  BY  NORWAY 

Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 

Kristiania,  August  22,  1919. 

Mr.  President: 

I  have  had  the  honor  to  receive  the  letter  by  which  your  Excellency 
has  kindly  informed  me  that  following  the  declaration  of  the  Norwegian 
Government  that  it  consents  to  recognize  de  facto  the  Lithuanian  Nation 
and  to  accept  its  Representative,  Mr.  Jonas  Augstuolis,  Lawyer,  has  been 
designated  as  the  Lithuanian  Representative  to  the  Government  of 
Norway. 

I  thank  your  Excellency  for  this  kind  communication  and  for  the 
sentiments  which  it  expresses  toward  Norway. 

In  adding  that  I  have  provided  a  cordial  welcome  for  Mr.  Augstuolis, 
I  take  the  opportunity  to  offer  to  your  Excellency  the  assurance  of  my 
highest  consideration. 

(Signed)  Loevland. 
To  His  Excellency, 

The  President  of  the  Council 
of  Ministers  of  Lithuania. 


21 


TRANSLATION  OF  NOTE  EXTENDING  RECOGNITION  TO 
LITHUANIA  BY  POLAND 

Telegram 

Warsaw,  1171  187. 

4-7    20-16 
To  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Lithuanian  Republic 

at  Kovno. 

Mr.  Minister  : 

I  have  the  honor  to  bring  to  the  knowledge  of  your  Excellency  that 
the  Polish  Government  has  decided  to  recognize  the  Constituent  As- 
sembly of  Lithuania  and  the  Government  placed  in  power  by  said 
Assembly  as  independent  organizations  de  facto.  Desiring  to  give  at  the 
same  time  practical  testimony  as  to  the  sentiment  which  the  Polish 
Nation  has  always  entertained  toward  your  country,  sentiments  which 
the  past  relations  of  the  two  Nations,  so  closely  allied,  will  I  hope  serve 
to  expand  and  strengthen,  the  Polish  Government  declares  it  is  ready 
on  its  part  to  enter  into  friendly  relations  with  the  Lithuanian  Govern- 
ment. The  Polish  Government  believes  that  the  application  of  principles 
of  justice  and  equity  in  all  the  relations  between  the  two  countries  and 
toward  the  national  minorities  of  each  other  will  form  the  most  secure 
basis  for  this  friendship. 

I  take  this  opportunity  to  present  to  you,  Mr.  Minister,  the  assurance 
of  my  high  consideration. 

(Signed)  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  Sapieha. 

4020 


22 


TRANSLATION  OF  NOTE  EXTENDING  RECOGNITION  TO 
LITHUANIA  BY  SWEDEN 

Berlin,  December  12, 1918. 

Mr.  Minister  : 

Referring  to  your  interview  with  the  Counsellor  of  the  Legation,  I 
have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  I  have  not  delayed  in  acquainting  my 
Government  with  the  desire  expressed  by  your  Government  to  see 
Sweden  recognize  the  Government  of  Lithuania  as  an  independent  State. 

In  accordance  with  the  instructions  of  my  Government  I  have  the 
honor  to  inform  you  that  the  Government  of  the  King,  desiring  to 
follow  the  same  policy  which  it  has  followed  in  similar  precedents,  and 
recognizing  the  situation  actually  existing,  is  not  able  to  accord  a 
formal  recognition  of  the  Lithuanian  State,  but  the  Government  of  the 
King  is  entirely  disposed  to  enter  into  unofficial  relations  de  facto  with 
the  representatives  of  the  actual  Government  of  Lithuania. 

In  so  far  as  your  note  refers  to  the  handling  of  Lithuanian  affairs 
in  Russia  by  the  Government  of  Sweden,  my  Government,  not  seeing 
its  way  clear  to  extending  formal  recognition  for  the  present  to  the 
Lithuanian  State,  does  not  believe  that  it  should  charge  itself  with 
the  protection  of  Lithuanian  interests  in  Russia. 

Please  accept,  Mr.  Minister,  the  assurance  of  my  high  consideration. 

(Signed)  Von  Essen, 

Minister  of  Sweden. 


23 


COPY  OF  NOTE  ANNOUNCING  RECOGNITION  OF  LITHUANIA  BY 
THE  ARGENTINE  REPUBLIC 

Embajada  de  la  Republica  Argentina 

Washington,  D.  C,  March  24,  1921. 

Mr.  J.  ViLEisis, 
Representative  of  Lithuania  in  America, 
703  15th  Street,  N.  W., 
Washington,  D.  C. 

Sir: 

We  have  the  pleasure  of  informing  you  that  according  to  cable 
despatches  received  at  the  Embassy,  our  Government  recognized  Lithu- 
ania as  a  free  and  independent  State  on  March  14th,  instant. 

Very  respectfully, 

(Signed)  Felipe  A.  Espil, 
First  Secretary  of  the  Embassy. 
FAE:EHS 


24 


COPY  OF  NOTE  ANNOUNCING  RECOGNITION  OF  LITHUANIA 

BY  MEXICO 

Embajada  de  Mexico 

Washington,  D.  C,  May  fifth,  1921. 
Sir: 

The  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Mexico,  which  I  have  the  honor 
to  represent  at  this  Capital,  has  instructed  me  to  inform  you  that,  after 
giving  due  consideration  to  the  contents  of  your  letters  of  February 
second  and  February  the  twenty-first,  respectively,  addressed  to  this 
Embassy,  the  Republic  of  Mexico,  officially  recognizes  the  independence 
of  the  Republic  of  Lithuania. 

Allow  me  to  give  expression  to  the  personal  sentiments  of  gratifica- 
tion with  which  I  have  the  honor  to  bring  the  foregoing  to  your  knowl- 
edge and  to  request  you  to  be  assured  that  the  people  and  the  Govern- 
ment of  Mexico  will  not  spare  any  effort  to  entertain  the  harmonious 
and  friendly  relations  that  I  am  confident  will  always  exist  between 
them  and  the  people  and  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Lithuania. 

I  avail  myself  of  this  opportunity  to  renew  to  you.  Sir,  the  assur- 
ances of  my  distinguished  consideration. 

(Signed)  Manuel  C.  Tellez. 
Monsieur  J.  Vileisis, 
Representative  of  Lithuania, 
etc.,  etc.,  etc., 

Washington,  D.  C. 


25 


V 


RECOGNITION  OF  LITHUANIA  BY  RUSSIA 
The  Peace  Treaty  Between  Lithuania  and  Russia 

(Translation) 

Article  I. 

Recognizing  the  basic  right  of  free  self-determination  which  belongs 
to  all  peoples,  and  which  justifies  the  complete  independence  of  the 
States  of  which  they  form  a  part,  and  which  the  Russian  Socialist,  Fed- 
erated Republic  of  the  Soviets  has  accepted,  Russia  recognizes  uncon- 
ditionally the  sovereignty  and  the  independence  of  the  State  of  Lithu- 
ania with  all  the  juridical  consequences  flowing  from  such  recognition 
and  Russia  renounces  forever  all  sovereign  rights  of  dominion  which  she 
possessed  heretofore  over  Lithuania  and  its  territory. 

The  fact  that  Lithuania  formerly  formed  a  part  of  Russia  does  not 
impose  upon  the  Lithuanian  Nation  any  obligation  toward  Russia. 

Moscow,  July  12, 1920. 


LETTER  TO  HON.  CHARLES  E.  HUGHES,  SECRE- 
TARY OF  STATE,  FROM  WM.  G.  McADOO. 

May  6,  1921. 
RE:  RECOGNITION  OF  LITHUANIAN  INDEPENDENCE. 

My  Dear  Mr.  Secretary: 

In  anticipation  of  seeing  you  personally  next  week  on  behalf  of 
the  Lithuanian  Government's  claim  for  recognition  by  the  United  States, 
I  respectfully  invite  your  attention  to  our  letter  to  Secretary  of  State 
Colby,  dated  February  15,  1921,  and  to  the  memorandum  submitted 
therewith  (extra  copies  of  which  are  enclosed)  in  which  are  set  forth 
in  some  detail  the  considerations  applicable  to  the  situation.  Having 
received  no  reply  from  Secretary  Colby  to  this  letter  and  believing 
firmly  that  a  favorable  decision  should  be  given,  I  take  the  liberty  of 
pressing  upon  your  earnest  consideration  the  arguments  therein  pre- 
sented. 

Plebiscite  Abandoned. 

In  this  connection  it  should  be  mentioned  that  since  the  date  of  the 
letter  mentioned  above,  the  plebiscite  planned  by  the  League  of  Nations 
for  the  so-called  "Vilna  District"  has  been  temporarily  abandoned, 
owing  to  the  difficulties  involved  in  its  supervision  by  the  League  of 
Nations  and  perhaps  because  of  Poland's  military  control  of  the  area 
in  question.  In  lieu  thereof,  the  League  has  suggested  that  the  boundary 
disputes  between  Poland  and  Lithuania  be  settled  if  possible  by  direct 
diplomatic  negotiations  under  the  auspices  of  the  League,  conducted 
through  a  joint  commission  of  delegates  from  the  two  nations. 

The  abandonment  of  the  plebiscite  renders  inapplicable  our  previous 
discussion  of  the  unfairness  of  holding  it  without  recognition 
of  Lithuania  by  the  United  States,  but  does  not  postpone  the  necessity 
for  such  recognition.  The  latest  advices  indicate  that  a  diplomatic 
settlement  of  the  disputes  will  be  impossible — Poland  in  the  absence 
of  recognition  of  Lithuania  regards  the  Vilna  District  as  territory  with- 
out official  status  and  appears  to  be  relying  upon  her  present  military 
control  to  result  in  permanent  acquisition  of  the  area.  The  situation 
presents  a  real  menace  to  peace  which,  I  believe,  recognition  of  Lithuania 
will  tend  greatly  to  lessen. 


27 

Upper  Silesia. 

The  placing  of  Poland  and  Lithuania  on  an  equal  political  and 
diplomatic  footing  in  the  United  States  is  essential  to  the  success  of 
peaceful  negotiations.  In  any  case  it  will  powerfully  aid  a  peaceful 
outcome.  The  recent  invasion  of  Upper  Silesia  by  Polish  forces,  after 
the  unfavorable  plebsicite  there,  indicates  an  attitude  which  Lithuania, 
in  the  absence  of  recognition,  may  well  have  reason  to  fear,  in  the 
event  of  a  diplomatic  adjustment  with  which  Poland  may  not  be  satisfied. 

Recognition  by  Argentina. 

To  our  previous  memorandum  are  attached  translations  of  notes 
extending  recognition  to  Lithuania  by  other  nations.  To  this  list  should 
now  be  added  the  Argentine  Republic  which  has  extended  de  jure  recog- 
nition to  Lithuania. 

I  sincerely  trust  that  the  United  States,  so  favorably  disposed  to 
the  national  aspirations  of  dependent  peoples,  will  give  the  request  of 
the  Lithuanian  Republic  for  recognition  the  most  careful  and  favorable 
consideration. 

Faithfully  yours, 

WiLUAM  G.  McAdoo. 
Hon.  Charles  E.  Hughes, 

Secretary  of  State, 

Washington,  D.  C. 


THE  ECONOMIC  BASIS  FOR  LITHUANIA'S 
CLAIM  TO  INDEPENDENCE 

The  following  facts  and  figures  have  been  compiled  by  the  Lithu- 
anian Information  Bureau,  with  the  special  purpose  of  disproving  the 
statement,  sometimes  heard,  that  Lithuania  is  economically  incapable 
of  supporting  herself  as  an  independent  State.  The  data  herein  are  in- 
tended to  present  in  condensed  form  what  is  most  pertinent  to  Lithua- 
nia's economic  situation. 

Lithuania  an  Agricultural  Coimtry. 

It  may  be  observed,  to  begin  with,  that  as  Lithuania  is  more  entirely 
an  agricultural  country  than  any  of  the  States  which  have  emerged  as 
self-governing  entities  from  the  world  war,  she  is  in  less  need  of  assist- 
ance from  without.  She  produces  within  her  own  borders  everything 
necessary  to  a  self-contained,  independent  existence.  To  be  sure,  she 
has  no  mineral  resources,  but  not  being  an  industrial  country,  she  has 
no  absolute  necessity  for  them.  On  the  other  hand,  Russia  has  no  need 
of  anything  which  Lithuania  produces.  This  is  not  to  say  that  Lithuania 
could  lead  a  healthy  existence  merely  as  a  "peasant  republic,"  such  as 
the  Boer  republics  of  South  Africa.  Her  full  cultural  development  of 
course  demands  active  intercourse  with  other  countries.  But  merely 
as  a  question  of  existence,  Lithuania's  position  is  as  favorable  as  that 
of  any  country,  and  much  more  favorable,  naturally,  than  that  of  a 
country  like  Switzerland,  say,  which  has  managed  to  maintain  its  inde- 
pendence during  a  period  when  larger  and  more  powerful  States  have 
been  broken  up  or  absorbed  by  their  neighbors. 

L    AREA  AND  POPULATION  OF  UTHUANIA. 

Lithuania,  including  the  Memel  District,  has   an   area  of  30,500„ 
square  miles,  more  than  Belgium  (11,373  square  miles).  The  Nether- 
lands (12,650  square  miles),  Denmark  (13,580  square  miles),  or  Switzer- 
land   (15,976   square   miles).     Lithuania's    area    and    population    are 
approximately  the  same  as  those  of  Bulgaria  before  the  war. 

The  population  of  this  territory  in  1914  was  4,345,000,  greater  than 
that  of  Denmark  (2,775,000),  Norway  (2,393,000),  or  Switzerland 
(3,781,000). 

A  large  majority  of  the  population  is  of  Lithuanian  blood  and 
speech.    Percentages :  Lithuanians,  70  per  cent;  Jews,  13  per  cent;  Poles, 


29 

8  per  cent;  Russians  and  White  Russians,  7  per  cent;  other  nationalities, 
2  per  cent. 

Population  of  larger  cities:  Vilna  (capital),  214,600;  Kovno,  90,300; 
Grodno,  61,600;  Memel,  32,000;  Suvalki,  31,600;  Shavli,  31,300. 

The  rural  population  is  86.2  per  cent  of  the  whole,  the  urhan  popu- 
lation, 13.6  per  cent. 

Occupations. 

The  population  was  divided,  by  occupations,  in  1897  (latest  official 
figures)  as  follows:  Agriculture  and  forestry,  71.4  per  cent;  industrial 
occupations,  7  per  cent;  commerce  and  transportation,  5.8  per  cent; 
domestics  and  laborers,  6.1  per  cent;  officials  and  liberal  professions, 
2.2  per  cent;  army  and  navy,  3.4  per  cent;  other  occupations,  2.8  per  cent. 

Education. 

Nuniber  of  schools  before  the  war:  Secondary  schools,  10; 
all  others,  600.  In  1919  there  were  31  secondary  schools,  1,630 
primary  schools  and  42  private  schools.  Several  agricultural  and  other 
technical  schoofs  have  also  been  established.  In  1911  there  was  one 
school  for  each  3,054  of  population;  there  is  now  one  school  for  each 
2,325.  The  Lithuanian  Government  spent  in  1919  five  times  as  much 
for  educational  purposes,  relative  to  the  proportion  of  Lithuanian  terri- 
tory actually  administered,  as  was  spent  by  the  Russian  Government 
before  the  war. 

II.    AGRICULTURE. 

This  is  the  chief  occupation  in  Lithuania.  Eighty  per  cent  of  the 
population  are  now  engaged  in  agricultural  pursuits.  The  entire  area 
of  arable  land  is  21,000,000  acres.  (Compare  with  State  of  Indiana, 
where  farms  occupy  21,999,000  acres.)  Before  the  war  farmers  (peasant 
proprietors)  owned  50  per  cent  of  the  land,  distributed  as  follows :  One 
per  cent  owned  125  to  250  acres;  66  per  cent  owned  25  to  125  acres;  3 
per  cent  owned  7 1-2  to  25  acres,  and  30  per  cent  less  than  7 1-2  acres. 
Great  landed  proprietors  owned  40  per  cent  of  the  land  and  the  govern- 
ment and  churches  owned  10  per  cent.  Seventeen  per  cent  of  the  rural 
population  owned  no  land.  Of  the  public  lands,  75,000  acres  have  been 
distributed  during  the  past  two  years  among  soldiers  and  their  families, 
in  farms  of  from  25  to  50  acres. 

Crop  Production. 

The  staples  are  rye,  wheat,  barley,  oats,  peas,  potatoes  and  flax. 
We  give  the  average  annual  production  before  the  war  for  the 
whole  of  Lithuania   (excluding  Memel,  then  part  of  Germany)    and 


30 

for  1920,  for  that  portion  of  Lithuania  under  the  administration 
of  the  Lithuanian  Government  (about  5-8  of  the  whole,  and 
also  excluding  Memel).  It  will  be  noted  that  as  to  wheat,  peas  and 
potatoes  there  is  a  relative  increase  in  the  1920  crop  over  the  pre-war 
figures.  There  is  also  a  great  increase  in  flax  production,  but  pre-war 
figures  for  this  are  not  available.  The  area  planted  in  flax  in  1921 
was  50  per  cent  greater  than  pre-war. 

Pre-war  average.        1920   (5-8  of  Lithuania). 
Eye 40,000,000  bushels  20,000,000  busheli 

(The  total  rye  crop  of  the  United  States  in  1913  wag  41,381,000  bushels.) 

Wheat 3,680,000  bushels  2,760,000  bushels 

Barley 11,500,000      "  6,900,000      " 

Oats 31,500,000      "  17,500,000      " 

Peas 2,400,000      "  2,200,000      " 

Potatoes 57,000,000      "  36,800,000      •< 

(The  potato  crop  of  Switzerland  in  1917  was  the  same  as  that  of 
Lithuania  for  1920—36,800,000  bushels.) 

Flax   40,000  tons 

Flaxseed 1,400,000  bushels 

Estimated  exports  of  above  products, 
1920-21 

Eye 600,000  bushels 

Wheat 736,000      " 

Barley 1,115,000      " 

Oats 2,450,000      " 

Flax 20,000  tons 


Stock  Raising. 

We  give  the  number  of  animals  in  1913,  in  the  whole  of  Lithuania, 
and  in  that  portion  which  is  now  administered  by  the  Lithuanian  Gov- 
ernment, also  the  number  in  1920  for  the  latter  territory.  The  actual 
increase  in  the  quicker  breeding  animals,  sheep  and  swine,  as  well 
as  the  relatively  small  diminution  in  the  number  of  horses  and 
cattle  are  notable  when  one  considers  the  destruction  of  the  war,  and 
indicate  Lithuania's  power  of  recuperation, 

1913  (alllAth.).  1913  (5-8  Uth.).  1920  (5-8  Litft.). 

Horses 762,000  495,000  380,000 

Cattle 1,481,000  998,000  865,000 

Sheep  and  goats    1,055,000  720,000  730,000 

Swine 2,000,000  1,350,000  1,400,000 

(Calves  and  lambs  are  not  included  in  the  above  figures.     Of  the  cattle 
700,000  are  milch  cows.) 


31 

For  purposes  of  comparison  we  give  the  numbers  of  stock  and  their 
value  on  January  1,  1919,  in  the  State  of  South  Carolina,  which  has  an 
area  almost  the  same  as  that  of  Lithuania  (30,495  square  miles)  although 
the  population  is  much  less  (1,515,400  in  1910). 

Nvmhers.      Estimated  value. 

Horses 82,000  $14,760,000 

Cattle 447,000  24,228,000 

Sheep 29,000  188,000 

Swine 1,056,000  22,176,000 

Forests. 

These  are  Lithuania's  greatest  sources  of  wealth.  More  than 
one-fourth  the  territory  is  in  forests,  of  which  80  per  cent  is  pine 
and  fir  and  20  per  cent  hard  wood.  Half  the  timber  cut  is  available  for 
export.  The  normal  annual  production  is  8,475,840,0(X)  feet  board 
measure.  (Compare  the  figures  for  the  State  of  Washington,  which 
in  1918  cut  about  half  the  above  quantity,  4,603,123,000  board  feet.) 
Before  the  war  most  of  the  lumber  was  rafted  into  Germany  and  sawn 
and  milled  there.  With  establishment  of  sawmills  in  Lithuania  this 
industry  could  be  greatly  and  profitably  developed.  Value  of  timber 
exported  in  1913,  $13,000,000. 


III.    INDUSTRY. 

Lithuania  has  never  been  a  manufacturing  country,  largely  because 
customs  duties  made  it  more  profitable  for  her  to  export  her  raw 
material.  Just  before  the  war,  however,  certain  industries,  such  as 
tanning  and  pottery,  were  beginning  to  develop.  Labor  is  cheap  in 
Lithuania  and  if  machinery  can  be  obtained  it  will  be  possible  for 
Lithuania  to  profitably  exploit  her  own  raw  materials.  The  factories 
were  almost  all  destroyed  during  the  war,  but  are  being  restored  as 
rapidly  as  means  permit.  Total  number  of  manufacturing  establish- 
ments in  Lithuania  in  1913  was  5,140,  employing  33,000  workmen  and 
producing  an  annual  value  of  $31,000,000. 


IV.    COMMERCE. 

Exports  and  imports  in  1913,  exclusive  of  Memel:  Exports, 
$20,000,000,  of  which  breadstuff s,  $3,000,000;  cattle  and  their  products, 
$4,000,000;  forest  products,  $13,000,000.  The  imports  were  about 
$12,500,000,  chiefly  of  coal,  iron,  textiles  and  metal  manufactures,  in- 
cluding machinery.  (Compare  Serbia  with  imports  in  1912,  of 
$20,625,000  and  exports  of  $16,373,000.) 


32 

For  the  present  year  (1920-21)  the  exports  of  hogs,  sheep  and 
poultry  should  approach  the  normal,  likewise  exports  of  timber  which 
during  the  first  part  of  1920  were  seriously  hindered  because  no  tariff 
agreement  had  been  reached  with  Germany.  The  recent  abolishment 
of  the  Memel  customs  frontier  should  also  be  of  great  advantage. 

Exports  for  the  first  six  months  of  1920  were  of  a  value  of  280,000,000 
marks,  while  imports  were  170,000,000  marks. 

Shipping  —  Port  of  Memel. 

It  is  to  be  supposed  that  the  Port  of  Memel  will  belong  to  Lithu- 
ania in  the  near  future.  It  will  be  Lithuania's  only  port.  It  is  superior 
to  Koenigsberg,  to  which,  however,  it  was  subordinated  under  German 
control.  The  average  depth  of  water  at  Memel  is  15  feet,  while  at 
Koenigsberg  it  is  only  12  feet.  Memel  is  free  of  ice  at  all  times.  The 
average  number  of  vessels  entered  and  cleared  at  Memel  for  the  five 
years,  1909-13,  inclusive,  was  817;  the  average  tonnage,  292,000.  The 
value  of  cargoes  for  1913  was  113,000,000  marks.  This  port  could  and 
would  be  greatly  improved  and  developed  under  Lithuanian  control. 

Railroads. 

The  total  mileage  of  railroads  in  Lithuania  is  1,552  miles,  of 
which  1,180  miles  are  broad  guage  and  the  rest  narrow  guage. 
The  roadbeds  are  generally  in  good  condition,  but  the  ties  need 
replacing.  Thirty  per  cent  of  the  railroad  stations  were  destroyed 
during  the  war,  but  have  been  rebuilt  provisionally.  So  also  of  the 
bridges,  most  of  which  are  now  of  wood,  except  on  the  line  Wirballen- 
Kovno-Vilna.  Rolling  stock  is  greatly  needed.  Gross  revenue  of 
Lithuanian  railroads  in  1913,  $12,000,000;  net  revenue,  deducting  nothing 
for  sinking  fund,  new  equipment,  etc.,  $6,500,000.  Lithuania  is  to 
receive  88  locomotives  and  1,400  cars  from  Germany,  by  the  terms  of 
the  agreement  between  the  Allied  Military  Mission  and  the  German 
Railroad  Administration.  So  far  only  58  locomotives  and  889  cars  have 
been  delivered. 

Rolling  stock  on  hand,  December  31,  1920:  (a)  broad  gauge  roads; 
locomotives  115,  cars  1,393;  (b)  narrow  gauge  roads;  52  locomotives 
(42  per  cent  out  of  repair) ,  671  cars  (40  per  cent  out  of  repair) . 

Waterways. 

Chief  of  these  is  the  River  Niemen,  5(X)  miles  in  length, 
navigable  for  rafts  360  miles  and  for  vessels  118  miles.  As  far  as 
Smalininken  (70  miles  from  its  mouth)  the  Niemen  is  navigable  for 
vessels  of  420  tons.    Small  vessels  go  as  far  as  Grodno.    The  principal 


33 

tributary  of  the  Niemen,  the  Vilija,  or  Neris,  is  also  navigable  for  small 
steamers  for  45  miles.    The  Niemen  is  open  for  230-270  days  in  the  year. 

V.    FINANCE  AND  CREDIT. 

Before  the  war  there  were  about  300  State  banks  and  a  like  number 
of  private  banks  in  Lithuania,  with  a  total  capital  of  $130,000,000.  The 
savings  banks  had  deposits  of  $80,000,000.  These  banks  disappeared 
during  the  war.  There  are  now  three  principal  banks  and  a  Co-operative 
Credit  Association.  The  banks  are:  Lithuanian  Commercial  and  In- 
dustrial Bank,  capital  2,000,000  marks;  Lithuanian  Bank  of  Commerce, 
capital  4,000,000  marks;  the  "Bank  of  Rural  Credit,"  capital  2,000,000 
marks.  Confidence  and  credit  will  improve  as  the  political  situation 
does  so.  The  establishment  of  peace  with  Soviet  Russia  has  had  a  good 
effect. 

Currency. 

The  money  in  circulation  is  the  "ostmark"  issued  by  Germany 
during  the  period  of  occupation.  It  is  guaranteed  by  Germany,  and 
is  equal  in  value  to  the  German  mark,  for  which  it  is  freely  ex- 
changed. The  circulation  is  about  1,000,000,000  ostmarks.  There  is 
also  still  a  considerable  quantity  of  Russian  rubles  and  some  Polish 
marks  in  circulation,  but  these  are  gradually  being  replaced  by  the 
ostmark. 

VI.    REVENUE  AND  EXPENDITURES,  DEBT,  ETC. 

The  direct  taxes  levied  by  the  State  are:  (a)  real  property  tax; 
(b)  tax  on  private  forests  up  to  8  per  cent  of  sales  of  timber;  (c)  patents 
for  commerce  or  industry;  (d)  progressive  inheritance  tax.  An  income 
tax  is  in  contemplation.  Indirect  taxes  are:  customs  duties;  taxes  on 
matches,  tobacco  and  alcohol;  export  licenses;  registrations  and  stamp 
taxes.  The  budget  for  1920  provides  for  expenditures  of  768,050,000 
marks  against  an  estimated  revenue  of  684,000,000  marks,  leaving  a 
deficit  of  84,050,000  marks,  to  be  met  by  a  loan. 

Soviet  Russia  has  agreed,  by  the  treaty  of  July  12,  1920,  to  pay  to 
Lithuania  the  sum  of  three  million  rubles  gold. 

Germany  advanced  merchandise  and  funds  to  Lithuania,  during 
the  war,  amounting  to  about  100,000,000  marks.  On  the  other  hand, 
Germany  assumed  the  right  of  emission  of  paper  money  for  Lithuania, 
which  she  still  exercises,  and  exploited  the  resources  of  the  country. 
Under  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  there  are  also  certain  questions  to  be 
discussed  regarding  Germany's  obligations.  Hence  the  settlement  of 
the  above  debt  is  pending. 


34 

Lithuania  purchased  from  the  United  States  army  supplies  in 
Francts  to  the  sum  of  about  $4,000,000. 

A  temporary  internal  loan  of  30,000,000  marks  raised  in  1919  has 
already  been  repayed.  An  internal  loan  of  100,000,000  marks  was 
recently  voted  by  the  Constituent  Assembly.  A  loan  is  also  being  raised 
among  Lithuanian  citizens  in  America. 

(Note. — The  above  memorandum  was  presented  to  the  Secretary  of  State  on  Monday, 
May  16,  1921,  by  Representative  W.  M.  Chandler,  in  connection  with  a  plea  for  recognition 
of  the  Baltic  States.) 


LITHUANIA,  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE 
LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS 

BY 

HERBERT  ADAMS  GIBBONS 

(This  article  originally  appeared  in  the  Century  Magazine  for  January,  1 92 1 .     Slight  alterationi,  and  an  addition 
of  several  pages,  have  been  made  to  bring  it  up  to  date.) 

Without  laying  stress  upon  the  influence  of  the  Entente  promises 
to  free  and  defend  small  nations,  none  can  understand  the  situation 
that  has  arisen  since  the  armistices  in  the  territories  of  the  former  Haps- 
burg,  Romanoff,  and  Ottoman  empires.  The  alternatives  before  the 
Paris  peace-makers  were  treating  all  subject  nationalities  alike,  in  a 
.spirit  of  impartial  justice,  with  the  idea  of  establishing  a  tolerable  new 
world  order;  or  blowing  hot  or  cold  upon  the  aspirations  and  claims  of 
subject  nationalities,  with  the  aim  of  advancing  the  particular  selfish 
interests  of  the  strongest  members  of  the  conference. 

Conflicting  Policies  in  Europe. 

The  inability  of  President  Wilson  to  resist  the  pressure  brought  to 
bear  upon  him  by  his  European  colleagues  made  the  latter  choice  in- 
evitable. Why  and  how  may  always  be  moot  questions,  but  the  fact 
remains  that  the  American  exponent  of  the  doctrine  of  self-determina- 
tion failed  to  dominate  the  conference.  Small  states  and  subject  nations 
lost  faith  in  his  power  to  help  them.  As  a  factor  in  the  settlement,  the 
United  States,  the  only  strong  state  with  no  ax  to  grind,  the  only  power 
which  might  have  filled  the  role  of  arbiter,  was  eliminated.  Had  it  been 
possible  for  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy  to  agree  upon  a  common 
policy  by  mutual  sacrifices  and  compromises  and  a  delimitation  of 
spheres  of  influence,  they  could  have  played  favorites  among  the  small 
nations  and  emancipated  races,  and  played  them  to  win.  The  political 
organisms  would  have  endured  as  Entente  statesmen  created  them,  and 
the  frontiers  as  Entente  statesmen  drew  them.  But  because  those  whose 
combined  forces  alone  could  have  established  peace  have  followed 
divergent  and  conflicting  policies  and  do  not  play  the  same  favorites, 
not  a  single  new  frontier  line  in  central  and  eastern  Europe  and  in 
western  Asia  is  as  yet  definitely  settled. 

New  Treaties. 

What  about  the  treaties  Europe  has  signed?  What  about  the 
League  of  Nations,  which  misguided  Americans  tried  to  convince  their 
fellow-countrymen  was  functioning?    What  about  the  authority  of  the 


36 

Supreme  Council  of  the  victorious  allies?  Treaties  are  not  binding 
unless  force  is  behind  them.  The  League  of  Nations  is  a  hollow  mockery 
without  force  behind  it.  The  Supreme  Council  can  be  defied  with  im- 
punity unless  it  is  in  a  position  to  use  force  to  win  respect  for  its  decrees. 
Gabriele  D'Annunzio  taught  us  this  lesson  soon  after  the  treaties  of 
Versailles  and  St.  Germain  were  signed.  He  seized  Fiume,  and  held  it 
in  defiance  of  Europe  for  a  year  and  a  half.  General  Gouraud,  officially 
responsible  to  France,  violated  both  the  spirit  and  letter  of  Article  XXII 
of  the  covenant  by  seizing  Damascus,  and  forcing  into  exile  one  of  the 
signers  of  the  covenant. 

Impotence  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

The  unwillingness  of  members  of  the  council  of  the  League  to  abide 
by  their  covenant  themselves  and  to  agree  to  do  their  part  in  fulfilling 
the  terms  of  the  treaties  imposed  upon  enemy  nations  led  to  other 
breaches  of  good  faith  and  disturbances  of  the  peace.  For  lawlessness 
breeds  lawlessness.  How  can  the  Great  Powers  expect  smaller  states  to 
observe  the  principles  of  international  equity  which  they  themselves 
ignore?  One  does  not  doubt  the  good  intentions  of  Mr.  Paderewski  of 
Poland  when  he  shook  hands  with  Mr.  Voldemar  of  Lithuania  at  the 
meeting  of  the  council  of  the  League  of  Nations  in  Paris  last  September. 
But  the  League  of  Nations  was  unable  to  prevent  Polish  aggression 
against  Lithuania,  even  though  the  Polish  member  on  the  Council  gave 
assurances  of  Poland's  good  faith.  Had  not  Mr.  Paderewski  pledged 
his  country  at  Paris  a  year  before  in  the  matter  of  the  use  of  the  Haller 
troops  against  Ukraine,  only  to  find  that  his  government  repudiated 
the  pledge? 

Zellgouski's  Adventure. 

Refusing  to  recognize  the  authority  of  the  League,  and  the  binding 
character  of  an  armistice  entered  into  by  his  own  Government,  the 
Polish  General  Zellgouski  invaded  Lithuania,  in  October,  1920,  took 
possession  of  the  capital,  Vilna,  and  marched  on  Kovno,  giving  battle 
merrily  to  the  Lithuanians.  Zellgouski  had  no  fear  of  being  called  to 
account. 

The  Zellgouski  escapade  accelerated  the  whirl  of  the  international 
whirlpool  more  than  those  of  D'Annunzio  and  Gouraud.  For  this  re- 
fractory Polish  general  mixed  things  up  in  the  most  dangerous  spot  in 
Europe.  The  differences  between  Yugo-Slavs  and  Italians,  between 
Arabs  and  French,  are  of  secondary  importance  to  the  general  peace  of 
the  world  in  comparison  with  events  in  the  border-lands  between  Ger- 
many and  Russia  and  Poland.  The  support  Poland  has  given  to  Zell- 
gouski— or  at  least  her  failure  to  suppress  him  without  foreign  interven- 


37 

tion,  as  Italy  finally  did  in  the  case  of  D'Annunzio — is  jeopardizing  the 
existence  of  Poland. 


"UveandUtUve" 

Poland  cannot  weaken  Lithuania  without  weakening  herself;  she 
cannot  destroy  Lithuania  without  destroying  herself;  she  cannot  incor- 
porate Lithuania  without  fattening  herself  for  the  slaughter.  It  is 
either  live  and  let  live  with  the  border-states  of  the  old  Romanoff  and 
HohenzoUern  empires  or  repartition.  The  tragic  lesson  of  history  in  this 
case  is  plain.  Unless  one  believes  that  the  German  and  Russian  races 
have  been  crushed  into  impotence,  Occidental  Europe  and  America  will 
play  a  losing  game  in  establishing  Poland  as  the  lone  sentinel,  at  the 
expense  of  her  neighbors,  between  Germany  and  Russia. 

Finland. 

Finland  had  a  great  start  in  getting  on  her  feet  over  her  less  fortu- 
nately situated  Baltic  sister  republics.  During  the  war  she  was  not  a 
battle-ground,  and  when  the  Petrograd  revolution  precipitated  the 
collapse  of  the  Russian  Empire,  the  Finns  were  able  to  proclaim  and 
maintain  their  independence.  They  were  off  in  a  comer  by  themselves, 
and  not  on  the  path  to  where  the  Bolshevists  wanted  to  go.  No  other 
state  laid  claim  to  any  portion  of  their  territory  other  than  the  Aland 
Islands.  They  were  able  to  hark  back  to  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  which 
had  stipulated  the  preservation  of  the  integrity  and  autonomy  of  the 
Duchy  of  Finland,  and  had  sanctioned  only  a  personal  union  with  the 
Russian  Empire.  The  Czar  was  to  be  Duke  of  Finland.  The  Finns 
argued  with  reason  that  the  disappearance  of  the  Czar  annuled  ipso  facto 
the  union  with  the  Russian  Empire.  This  paved  the  way  to  a  speedy 
recognition  of  the  independence  of  Finland  by  the  Entente  powers  and 
neutrals,  and  the  admission  of  Finland  to  the  League  of  Nations.  The 
successive  revolutionary  governments  in  Russia  made  no  objection  to 
the  secession  of  Finland  from  the  empire,  but  the  compelling  motive 
of  speedy  Entente  recognition  was  the  fact  that  Germany  recognized 
Finland  and  had  a  powerful  propaganda  in  Finland.  Before  the  revo- 
lution the  Entente  powers  had  been  bitterly  hostile  to  Polish  and  Finnish 
aspirations,  and  this  fact  had  won  Finnish  sympathy  for  Germany. 
Unlike  Poland,  Finland  had  no  terre  irredente  to  claim  from  the  Central 
empires,  and  therefore  saw  in  the  victory  of  the  Central  empires  her 
chance  of  breaking  away  from  Russia.  After  the  revolution,  the  Entente 
powers  conveniently  forgot  the  pro-Germanism  of  Finland.  Being  able 
to  recognize  Finland  without  offending  Russia,  they  promptly  did  so, 
and  began  to  intrigue  to  induce  the  Finns  to  attack  the  Bolshevists. 


38 

The  Baltic  Barons. 

Prussian  influence  had  been  strong  in  the  Baltic  countries  north 
of  the  frontier  of  1795  ever  since  the  Middle  Ages.  Memel  and  Libau 
and  Riga  were  German-built  cities.  Almost  to  Petrograd  a  nobility  of 
Germanic  origin  constituted  the  land-owning  class  along  the  coast,  and 
German  merchants  abounded  in  the  ports.  The  Baltic  barons  fell  in 
readilj'  with  the  extension  of  Russian  sovereignty  to  the  Baltic  Sea  in 
Esthonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania,  and  became  loyal  servitors  of  the 
Russian  Government  and  cooppressors  of  the  subject  races.  And  as 
readily,  when  the  Russian  armies  were  beaten  in  the  World  War,  the 
Baltic  barons  welcomed  their  invading  kinsmen  and  worked  for  the 
King  of  Prussia.  The  Russian  Revolution  did  not  give  the  other  Baltic 
races  the  opportunity  it  gave  the  Finns.  The  Lithuanians  were  under 
German  military  domination.  The  Latvians  were  in  the  field  of  military 
operations  until  the  Treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  was  signed.  The  Esthonians 
soon  had  to  cope  with  the  Bolshevist  movement,  of  which  Reval,  their 
capital,  became  a  center. 

Lithuania  is  Not  Pro-German. 

At  the  end  of  1917,  Lithuania,  like  Poland,  was  offered  independence 
by  the  Austro-Germans  in  exchange  for  a  political  alliance,  economic 
advantages,  and  military  cooperation  against  the  Entente.  Intrigue  and 
intimidation  failed.  The  Lithuanians  not  only  resisted  with  success  the 
pressure  of  their  conquerors,  who  tried  to  disguise  themselves  as  liber- 
ators, but  held  a  national  council  at  Vilna  on  February  16,  1918,  which 
proclaimed  the  independence  of  Lithuania,  declared  against  special 
favors  either  to  the  conqueror  or  the  former  master,  and  set  up  a  pro- 
visional government.  Kaiser  Wilhelm  first,  and  the  King  of  Saxony 
later,  tried  to  beguile  the  Lithuanians  into  forming  an  alliance  with 
Germany.  Is  it  conceivable  that  the  Lithuanian  leaders  who  defied 
Germany  in  her  hour  of  triumph  and  when  their  country  was  held  by  a 
German  army  have  been  in  connivance  with  defeated  Germany? 

When  Dr.  Vileisis,  a  member  of  the  Lithuanian  Government,  came 
to  the  United  States  recently  to  try  to  secure  American  recognition  of 
I.,ithuanian  independence,  I  was  told  by  a  highly  placed  Pole  that  he 
was  "notoriously  pro-German,  like  all  the  Lithuanian  politicians." 
When  I  inquired  into  the  record  of  Dr.  Vileisis,  I  found  out  that  he  had 
been  arrested  by  the  Germans,  thrown  for  several  months  into  prison 
and  threatened  with  execution  because  he  would  not  aid  the  Germans, 
and  then  exiled  to  an  internment  camp  in  Germany.  There  has  been  a 
systematic  and  persistent  propaganda  in  the  United  States,  in  which 
certain  men  connected  with  the  State  Department  have  had  their  part, 
to  represent  the  Lithuanians  as  pro-Germans,  Bolshevists,  or  Poles.  You 
can  take  your  choice. 


3d 

Effect  of  German  Defeat. 

Real  liberation  and  the  hope  of  statehood  came  to  the  Baltic  Sea 
republics  only  after  the  defeat  of  Germany.  At  Vilna  for  Lithuania  and 
at  Riga  for  Latvia,  independence  was  formally  proclaimed  and  govern- 
ments set  up  before  the  Germans  withdrew.  The  Esthonians  at  Reval 
were  already  under  a  regularly  constituted  independent  government. 
There  was  no  more  reason  to  doubt  the  genuineness  and  permanency 
and  legitimacy  of  these  national  movements  than  in  any  other  part  of 
Europe.  The  Baltic  Sea  republics,  ethnographically  and  historically, 
had  as  much  right  to  expect  from  the  victory  of  the  Entente  the  revival 
of  their  nationhood  as  Poland  and  Bohemia. 

Baltic  Aid  Against  Bolshevild. 

Before'  the  conference  met  at  Paris,  the  powers  of  the  victorious 
alliance  had  entered  into  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Baltic  Sea 
republics.  They  received  accredited  military  missions,  and  their  gov- 
ernments had  no  intimation  that  they  would  be  treated  differently  from 
Poland.  In  fact,  they  were  assured  that  formal  recognition  of  their 
independence  and  a  seat  at  the  peace  conference  were  withheld  only 
because  it  was  necessary  not  to  discourage  or  discredit  the  anti-Bolshe- 
vist generals  to  whom  the  Entente  was  giving  military  aid  to  crush 
Lenine.  As  they  felt  that  their  existence  depended  upon  the  overthrow 
of  the  Moscow  soviet,  or  at  least  in  keeping  soviet  propaganda  away 
from  their  own  countries,  the  Baltic  Sea  republics  were  content  with 
informal  pledges.  They  realized  the  delicacy  of  the  situation  and  kept 
in  the  background  at  Paris.  On  the  other  hand,  their  cooperation  alone 
made  possible  the  military  plans  of  the  Entente  against  the  Bolshevists. 
They  allowed  their  territory  to  be  used  as  a  base  of  operations  against 
Petrograd  and  Moscow,  they  received  military  supplies  from  the  Entente 
powers,  and  were  guided  by  the  advice  of  the  military  missions  in  the 
projected  campaigns  against  Petrograd  and  Moscow. 

Failure  of  Attacks  on  Bolsheviki. 

The  Baltic  Sea  republics  needed  food  and  supplies  and  money. 
Ravaged  and  plundered  during  five  years  by  Russians  and  Germans 
alike,  they  were  beggars  who  could  not  choose  their  friends.  Loyalty 
and  decency  did  not  seem  to  abide  in  Entente  diplomacy  any  more 
than  in  that  of  the  Germans.  But  the  Baltic  states  could  not  break  with 
us.  As  long  as  there  was  hope  of  killing  sovietism,  the  Baltic  Sea  repub- 
lics were  ready  to  work  with  us.  The  complete  disasters  that  attended 
the  anti-Bolshevist  movements  opened  the  eyes  of  the  Baltic  Sea 
republics. 


40 

Yudenitch,  the  Archangel  Republic,  Koltchak,  and  Denikin  had  been 
induced  by  Entente  military  missions  to  attack  Lenine.  But  each  in 
succession  had  been  left  in  the  lurch  to  shift  for  himself  when  the 
fortunes  of  war  changed.  We  were  merely  rooters  on  the  side  lines. 
The  withdrawal  from  Archangel  was  the  strongest  possible  argument 
against  a  Baltic  Sea  republic  invasion  of  Russia.  The  plan  of  using  the 
Baltic  states  for  pulling  Entente  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire  had  to  be 
abandoned.  The  military  missions  limited  their  political  efforts  to 
preventing  the  Baltic  republics  from  signing  peace. 

Esthonia  Makes  Peace  With  RuMia. 

The  Koltchak  debacle  and  the  abandonment  of  the  Archangel  front 
by  the  Entente  armies  compelled  Esthonia  to  treat  with  the  Bolshevists. 
A  glance  at  the  map  will  convince  any  fair-minded  man  that  the  Esths 
had  no  other  choice.  It  was  peace  or  extinction.  The  Entente  missions 
strenuously  objected  to  the  negotiations,  but  they  failed  to  advance  the 
only  argument  that  would  have  counted,  a  definite  pledge  of  military 
aid  to  the  amount  of  two  hundred  thousand  Entente  troops  to  be  kept 
in  the  country  as  long  as  the  Esthonian  Government  had  reason  to  fear 
a  Bolshevist  invasion. 

"Moral  Support" 

The  Peace  of  Dorpat,  signed  on  January  21,  1920,  was  not  evidence 
of  Esthonian  perfidy  or  pro-Bolshevist  leanings.  It  was  evidence  of  the 
complete  military  importance  of  the  Entente  and  the  United  States  and 
of  the  failure  of  our  blockade  to  destroy  sovietism  in  Russia.  During 
the  recent  Presidential  campaign,  Mr.  F.  D.  Roosevelt  told  the  Poles  of 
Milwaukee  that  they  had  Senator  Lodge  to  thank  for  the  presence  of  the 
Bolshevist  army  before  Warsaw,  because,  if  the  United  States  had  been 
a  member  of  the  league,  the  Bolshevists  would  not  have  dared  to  cross 
the  Polish  frontier.  And  yet  Mr.  Roosevelt  was  careful  to  add  (for  the 
sake  of  the  votes  of  mothers  present)  that  our  aid  to  Poland  would  have 
been  only  "moral."  If  the  Esths,  face  to  face  with  the  Red  armies,  had 
refused  to  make  peace  with  Lenine,  relying  on  the  "moral  support"  of 
the  League  of  Nations,  what  does  our  common  sense  tell  us  would  have 
happened  to  Esthonia?  Esthonia  was  bitterly  reproached  for  having 
signed  the  Peace  of  Dorpat  by  the  very  journals  and  men  who,  seven 
months  later,  gave  Poland  in  a  similar  plight  urgent  counsels  to  do 
what  they  had  denounced  Esthonia  for  doing. 

Poleind,  Lithuania  and  Latvia  Make  Peace  With  Russia. 

There  is  no  word  of  condemnation  for  Poland  because  she  signed 
the  Peace  of  Riga  in  October,  1920.  In  fact,  she  was  officially  advised  to 
make  peace  with  Lenine.    But  abandoning  the  fight  against  Moscow  and 


41 

establishing  official  relations  with  Lenine  have  been  used  against  the 
Baltic  Sea  republics  as  reasons  for  considering  them  pro-Bolshevist  and 
withholding  recognition  of  their  independence.  For  Latvia  and  Lithu- 
ania had  to  follow  the  lead  of  Esthonia  and  Finland,  and  anticipated  the 
Russo-Polish  treaty  by  a  few  months.  The  treaties  have  now  been 
published.  They  contain  no  provisions  more  advantageous  to  the  Bol- 
shevists than  those  of  the  Russo-Polish  treaty  of  Riga. 

Great  Britain  Recognizes  Baltic  States. 

The  Englishmen  at  Dorpat  last  January  worked  just  as  strenuously 
as  their  Allies  to  prevent  Lenine  from  getting  the  Esths  to  make  peace; 
but  once  the  treaty  was  signed,  they  accepted  the  situation  and  sought 
to  make  the  best  of  it.  Not  under  the  spell  of  the  quixotism  that  seems 
to  inspire  our  State  Department  in  its  foreign  policy,  and  having  no 
valid  reason,  as  the  French  had,  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  Russia  and 
refuse  to  deal  with  Bolshevism  until  money  owed  by  the  old  regime 
was  paid  or  acknowledged  as  a  legitimate  obligation,  the  British  recog- 
nized the  independence  of  the  Baltic  Sea  republics  and  entered  into 
diplomatic  relations  with  them. 

Italy  and  France  Recognize  Baltic  States. 

Italy,  impatient  for  some  solution,  no  matter  what,  of  the  Russian 
imbroglio,  followed  Great  Britain's  lead.  France  did  not  dare  to  stand 
out  against  de  facto  recognition.  To  abstain  from  diplomatic  inter- 
course with  the  Baltic  Sea  republics  would  have  been  to  renounce  the 
economic  exploitation  of  these  countries  in  favor  of  the  British.  So 
the  Baltic  representatives  are  received  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  and  French 
diplomats  are  working  at  Libau  and  Riga  and  Reval  to  prevent  a  British 
trade  and  banking  monopoly  in  Lithuania,  Latvia,  and  Esthonia,  and  to 
throw  a  monkey-wrench  in  the  works  of  the  British  naval  machine  which 
is  aiming  at  the  supremacy  of  the  Baltic  Sea. 

Economic  Laws. 

All  this  has  not  come  about  in  a  minute.  The  changed  attitude 
toward  the  new  political  status  quo  in  the  eastern  Baltic  and  toward  the 
question  of  trading  with  Russia  is  due  to  the  remorseless  working  of 
economic  laws  which  prove  in  the  long  run  more  powerful  than  the 
combinazione  of  statesmen.  Politics  naturally  yields  to  economics,  for 
trade  is  the  raison  d'etre  of  the  foreign  policy  of  nations.  Prejudices 
die  hard.  The  influences  working  against  the  stability  of  the  Baltic 
Sea  republics  at  London  and  Paris  are  still  strong.  French  opposition 
among  anti-Bolshevists,  Russian  bond-holders,  and  amis  de  la  Pologne 
is  still  active.    A  reactionary  group  in  Great  Britain,  led  by  Winston 


42 

Churchill,  is  ready  to  sacrifice  the  Lithuanians,  Latvians,  and  Esths  to 
whatever  Russian  Government  may  be  able  to  stamp  out  Bolshevism  and 
replace  Lenine  and  his  associates.  The  Russians  who  pulled  the  strings 
for  the  Entente  in  the  various  anti-Bolshevist  fiascos  still  watch  the 
development  of  the  Baltic  situation  and  refuse  to  admit  any  diminution 
of  "integral  Russia."  Polish  propaganda  ridicules  the  right  of  the  Baltic 
races  to  separate  existence. 

Colby  Note  of  August  10,  1920. 

Under  these  conditions,  the  observer  of  European  international 
politics  who  believes  in  a  square  deal  for  everybody  deplores  the  Colby 
note  of  August  10,  1920.  None  questions  the  good  faith  of  Mr.  Colby 
and  his  associates  in  their  anxiety  to  convince  the  Russian  people  of  our 
detachment  and  good-will  and  to  try  to  reconcile  our  implacable  oppo- 
sition to  Bolshevism  with  our  affection  for  Russia.  Our  State  Depart- 
ment undoubtedly  meant  well,  and  thought  it  was  making  a  masterly 
move;  but  one  does  not  need  to  go  farther  than  the  Encyclopaedia 
Britannica,  certainly  an  impartial  source  in  the  present  debate,  to  con- 
vince oneself,  by  glancing  over  the  admirable  summaries  of  historical 
facts  from  the  best  sources,  of  Mr.  Colby's  unfairness  and  inconsistency 
in  announcing  in  the  same  document  that  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  is  to.  preserve  at  all  costs  "Russian  integrity"  and  at  the  same  time 
to  maintain  Poland's  territorial  integrity  by  "the  employment  of  all 
available  means." 

Austria-Hungary  and  Russia. 

After  reading  in  the  Britannica  the  stories  of  the  formation  of  the 
two  political  organisms  of  1914,  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia,  compare 
Mr.  Wilson's  note  of  September  7,  1918,  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Gov- 
ernment. Did  not  the  Romanoffs  as  much  as  the  Hapsburgs  build  their 
empires  upon  the  ruins  of  small  races  of  alien  blood  and  institutions 
and  religion?  If  the  moral  sense  of  the  world  demands  the  liberation 
and  restoration  to  nationhood  of  races  in  slavery  to  Austrians  and  Hun- 
garians, how  can  Mr.  Colby  declare  that  the  policy  of  our  Government 
stands  for  the  return  to  slavery  of  nations  whose  life  was  extinguished 
by  the  Russians?  We  asked  the  blessing  of  God  upon  our  arms  to 
assure  us  the  victory  because  we  were  fighting  for  humanity.  In  our 
prayers  we  put  no  limit  on  our  philanthropy. 

America's  Promise  to  Oppressed  People. 

On  July  4,  1918,  when  President  Wilson  received  the  representa- 
tives of  subject  races  at  Mount  Vernon,  he  made  a  solemn  pledge  in 
the  name  of  the  American  people  to  all  subject  races.    A  Lithuanian 


4S 

stood  with  the  others  before  Washington's  tomb.  Neither  in  that  speech 
nor  in  any  other  did  Wilson  say,  "You  understand,  of  course,  that  the 
victorious  allies  mean  to  free  and  restore  only  the  subject  races  whose 
freedom  and  restoration  will  be  at  the  expense  of  and  to  the  confusion 
of  our  enemies."  Had  he  said  this,  it  would  have  been  a  manly  con- 
fession— to  avoid  false  hopes  and  false  pretences — of  what  was  after- 
ward evident  at  the  peace  conference,  that  the  yearning  for  humanity 
was  a  sham  and  the  proclamation  of  the  doctrine  of  self-determination 
a  falsehood.  The  moral  issue  was  simply  bunk  to  make  people  feel  good 
and  arouse  them  against  the  Germans.  Because  races  were  conquered 
by  the  Romanoffs,  have  they  less  right  to  freedom  than  if  they  were 
conquered  by  the  Hapsburgs  and  HohenzoUerns? 

Inconsistency  of  "Russian  Policy." 

When  we  read  carefully  the  Colby  note,  which  is  meant  to  justify 
the  refusal  of  the  State  Department  to  follow  the  example  of  our  asso- 
ciates in  recognizing  and  dealing  with  and  helping  the  Baltic  Sea 
republics,  we  can  challenge  its  logic  as  well  as  its  misrepresentation 
of  the  American  idealism  expressed  by  President  Wilson  during  the 
war.  Poland  and  Finland  were  portions  of  "integral  Russia";  so  was 
Russian  Armenia;  so  was  Bessarabia.  Without  consulting  Russia,  we 
have  recognized  the  independence  of  Poland,  Finland,  and  Armenia,  and 
have  agreed  to  the  inclusion  of  Bessarabia  in  Rumania. 

Treaty  of  Vienna. 

The  State  Department  expert  will  respond  that  Poland  and  Finland 
had  a  special  status  under  the  Treaty  of  Vienna.  Why  go  back  in  regard 
to  Russia  only  to  the  Treaty  of  Vienna?  In  making  the  treaties  of  Ver- 
sailles and  St.  Germain  we  canceled  the  Treaty  of  Vienna.  We  ignored 
this  treaty  and  all  other  treaties  in  dealing  with  subject  races  of  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Germany.  The  attempt  to  justify  partiality  of  treatment 
between  Poland  and  the  Baltic  Sea  republics  on  the  ground  of  the  Treaty 
of  Vienna  fails  even  if  we  did  accept  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  as  the  law 
and  the  prophets.  The  Grand  Duchy  of  Lithuania  enjoyed  an  individual 
status  in  the  Russian  Empire  by  virtue  of  arrangements  made  before 
the  Napoleonic  period  and  not  infringed  upon  until  1830.  The  charter 
of  Lithuania  was  not  finally  Abrogated  until  1848,  and  the  title  of  grand 
Duke  of  Lithuania  was  assumed  by  the  Russian  Czar  on  a  par  with  that 
of  King  of  Poland  and  Grand  Duke  of  Finland  at  coronations.  This 
acknowledgment  of  the  separate  identity  of  Lithuania  in  the  empire 
was  never  given  up.  The  late  Nicholas  was  crowned  Grand  Duke  of 
Lithuania. 


44 

Lithuania  on  Same  Footing  as  Poland. 

From  a  historical  point  of  view  the  American  State  Department  has 
no  ground  to  stand  upon  in  regarding  Lithuania  as  a  Russian  province 
and  at  the  same  time  holding  that  Poland  is  an  independent  kingdom. 
The  relations  of  the  two  countries  toward  the  Russian  Empire  are  strik- 
ingly alike.  Both  lost  their  independence  through  the  partitions  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  after  having  been  for  centuries  great  and  flour- 
ishing empires.  Both  suffered  horribly  from  czardom  during  the' 
nineteenth  century.    Both  were  battle-grounds  during  the  late  war. 

Commissioner  Gade's  Opinions. 

Commander  Gade,  an  American  reserve  naval  officer  who  repre- 
sented us  in  the  Baltic  provinces  and  has  since  been  able  to  impress 
his  personal  opinions  upon  the  State  Department,  justifies  the  non- 
recognition  policy  on  practical  economic  grounds.  He  maintains  that 
these  countries  cannot  exist  independently,  and  ought  not  to  be  encour- 
aged in  their  aspirations  for  nationhood,  because  Russia  needs  them 
as  an  economic  outlet  to  the  sea,  while  much  of  their  prosperity  must 
come  from  transit  trade.  Commander  Gade  has  advanced  this  point  of 
view  earnestly  and  plausibly.  It  'appeals  to  American  common  sense, 
which  believes  that  in  union  there  is  strength. 

Nationalist  Movements. 

But  we  forget  the  treaties  of  Versailles  and  St.  Germain.  One  may 
have  his  own  opinion  about  the  advisability  of  the  policy  of  emiettement 
(breaking  in  pieces)  of  political  organisms  that  represented  the  econ- 
omic evolution  of  past  centuries.  We  are  committed,  however,  to  just 
that  policy.  It  is  too  late  to  question  it.  I  have  never  been  an  unreason- 
ing and  sentimental  pleader  for  the  doctrine  of  self-determination,  but 
I  have  maintained,  as  a  student  of  nationalist  movements,  that  the  effort 
to  limit  the  application  of  self-determination  to  races  whose  liberation 
helps  the  fancied  interests  of  a  few  great  powers  is  disastrous  and 
makes  impossible  the  establishment  of  peace. 

Economic  Strength  of  Lithuania. 

Political  expediency  is  never  more  than  a  temporary  makeshift. 
Old  problems  are  solved  only  by  creating  new  ones.  It  stands  to  reason 
that  we  cannot  in  one  breath  lop  off  frontier  provinces  from  Germany 
on  the  ground  of  the  alien  character  of  their  inhabitants  and  destroy 
the  Hapsburg  Empire  on  the  ground  of  the  right  of  its  various  elements 
to  an  independent  existence,  and  in  the  next  breath  tell  other,  and  neigh- 
boring subject  races  that  they  have  no  future  outside  of  the  Romanoff 


4S 

Empire.  Lithuania  has  a  better  economic  raison  d'etre  than  Poland 
and  Czeclio-Slovakia.  Lithuania  and  the  other  Baltic  Sea  republics 
have  precedents  that  refute  the  argumentation  of  Gade  and  our  State 
Department  not  only  in  regard  to  their  right  and  ability  to  exist  inde- 
pendently of  Russia,  but  also  independently  of  one  another. 

Belgium  and  Holland. 

If  the  reader  will  take  the  map  of  Europe  and  look  at  the  location 
of  the  German  Empire  and  follow  its  river  courses  in  relation  to 
Belgium  and  Holland,  and  then  compare  the  similar  situation  of  Russia 
in  relation  to  Lithuania,  Latvia,  and  Esthonia,  he  will  readily  see  how 
the  Gade  position,  which  our  State  Department  has  foolishly  adopted, 
resembles  the  position  of  German  economists  toward  Belgium.  Stand- 
ing between  a  great  empire  and  the  sea  is  no  reason  to  deny  the  right 
of  a  race  to  nationhood.  The  Dutch  and  a  part  of  the  Belgians  are 
very  much  closer  the  Germans  racially  than  the  Lithuanians  and  Latvi- 
ans are  to  the  Russians  and  Poles.  The  access  to  the  sea  argument  for  a 
big  fellow  crushing  the  life  out  of  a  little  fellow  I  thought  we  had 
definitely  scotched.  It  is  disconcerting  to  see  it  crop  up  in  our  own 
country  in  official  circles.  The  other  two  parts  of  the  Gade  economic 
argument  are  also  refuted  by  Belgium  and  Holland.  These  countries 
have  existed  economically,  flourished,  and  been  able  to  defend  them- 
selves against  Germany,  England,  and  France.  And  they  have  existed 
now  for  nearly  a  hundred  years  as  separate  entities.  Why  should  not 
Baltic  Sea  states  get  along  as  well  as  North  Sea  states?  The  Baltic 
Sea  already  has  little  states  less  extensive  in  territory  and  some  of  them 
less  populous  than  the  new  Baltic  Sea  republics. 

Federation  With  Russia. 

But  Lithuania,  Latvia,  and  Esthonia,  by  asking  for  the  recognition 
of  their  independence,  do  not  close  the  door  upon  the  possibility  of  a 
Russian  federation  or  a  federation  among  themselves.  In  this  time 
of  upset  and  confusion  they  are  asking  simply  for  a  free  hand  to  look 
out  for  their  own  interests.  As  Russian  provinces,  with  no  separate 
international  status,  they  could  resist  neither  Bolshevists  nor  Russian 
reactionaries.  They  would  be  in  the  plight  of  the  rest  of  Russia  now, 
and  tomorrow,  when  the  reaction  comes,  have  to  submit  to  a  return  to 
the  old  intolerable  conditions,  alien  landowners  and  alien  office-holders 
grinding  the  life  out  of  them. 

The  Baltic  Sea  republics  may  develop  into  vigorous  independent 
states,  or  they  may  return  to  membership  in  the  political  organism  of 
a  new  and  regenerated  Russia;  but  in  the  meantime  they  have  to  live, 
and  when  the  moment  for  the  reconstitution  of  integral  Russia  comes, 


46 

these  subject  races  will  know  by  experience  whether  independence  is 
possible  or  preferable  from  an  economic  point  of  view,  and  will  be  able 
to  lay  down  political  and  social  stipulations  if  they  feel  that  it  is  wisest 
to  go  back  to  Russia. 

"A  Complete  Reversal." 

The  best  thought  in  Great  Britain  is  in  favor  of  looking  upon  the 
Baltic  Sea  republics  in  this  light.  The  British  Government  stands  for 
giving  them  a  chance.  The  Anglo-Saxon  instinct  says,  give  them  a 
chance !  Why  do  we  have  to  tolerate  such  an  unjust  and  stupid  policy 
as  that  outlined  in  the  Colby  note?  One  is  thankful  that  President 
Harding  has  promised  "a  complete  reversal"  of  American  foreign  policy. 
For  our  honor  as  well  as  for  our  interests,  the  election  of  Harding  is  a 
great  victory.  We  may  not  be  able  to  take  on  the  defense  of  the  small 
nations  the  world  over;  at  least  we  shall  refrain  from  giving  official 
sanction  to  stifling  their  aspirations. 

Poland's  Territorial  Appetite. 

In  an  article  in  The  Century  for  November,  1916,  advocating  inde- 
pendence for  Poland,  when  the  Poles  had  no  friends  in  Entente  official 
circles  and  Americans  regarded  the  resurrection  of  Poland  as  a  dream 
in  the  category  with  the  restoration  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France,  I 
warned  the  Poles  against  the  danger  of  an  inordinate  territorial  appetite. 
A  year  later,  when  the  Russian  Revolution  had  made  encouragement 
of  Poland  a  diplomatic  possibility  for  the  Entente,  I  heard  M.  Roman 
Dmowski,  at  the  Comite  National  d'Etudes  in  the  Cour  de  Cassation, 
Paris,  set  forth  the  aspirations  of  Poland.  M.  Dmowski  spoke  as  if  two 
racial  units  alone,  the  Russians  and  the  Poles,  faced  each  other  from 
the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea.  He  limited  the  problem  of  the  future 
border-lands  between  Russia  and  the  Central  empires  to  the  recognition 
of  Poland's  independence  and  the  backing  of  Poland's  claims  at  the 
peace  conference.  Dmowski  did  not  mention  the  Lithuanians  and  the 
Ukrainians.  This  was  the  beginning  of  a  policy  that  has  ruled  the 
Polish  attitude  toward  the  eastern  frontiers  of  their  state.  The  Poles 
insisted  in  the  west  on  the  inclusion  of  every  district  inhabited  by  Poles. 
In  the  east  they  have  regarded  the  ethnographical  argument  as  non- 
existent. 

Lithuania's  Relations  with  Poland. 

Poland  claims  all  the  Russian  borderlands,  including  Lithuania,  as 
part  of  historic  Poland.  The  Ukrainians  and  Lithuanians,  whose 
ethnographical  territories  are  thus  refused  them,  claim  also  to  have 
ruled  all  these  lands  at  one  time.    The  Lithuanians  deny  ever  having 


47 

been  conquered  by  the  Poles  or  having  formed  more  than  a  personal 
union  with  the  Polish  state,  and  declare  that  they  were  victims  of  the 
partitions  not  as  a  part  of  Poland,  but  as  an  independent  state.  The 
historic  argument  applied  to  the  Russian  border-lands  is  very  much 
like  that  used  by  the  Balkan  States  in  their  rival  claims  to  Macedonia. 
At  some  lime  or  other  each  in  turn  was  the  upper  dog  and  owned  the 
disputed  territories. 


Polish  Policies. 

The  ungenerous  attitude  of  Poland  toward  all  her  neighbors  is 
peculiarly  disheartening.  One  would  think  that  the  Poles  had  suffered 
so  much  from  the  hands  of  their  masters  that  they  would  instinctively 
refrain  from  playing  the  detested  role  themselves.  But  one  must 
reluctantly  admit  that  the  Poles  seem  to  have  learned  only  how  to 
employ  the  brutal  methods  of  their  own  conquerors.  As  Russians  and 
Germans  acted  toward  the  Poles,  so  have  the  Poles  been  acting  toward 
Lithuanians  and  Ukrainians.  We  remember  how  the  Poles  pilloried  the 
colonization  schemes  of  their  Prussian  masters.  Exactly  the  same 
schemes  they  are  adopting  in  turn  toward  weaker  races. 

The  Poles  have  taken  on  as  enemies  all  their  neighbors,  Germans. 
Czecho-Slovaks,  Ukrainians,  Russians  and  Lithuanians.  The  state  they 
propose  to  form  contains  so  many  alien  enemies  in  juxtaposition  geo- 
graphically to  "brothers  of  blood"  that  it  is  bound  to  collapse  under 
the  weight  of  a  circle  of  irredentist  movements.  The  Poles  should  have 
made  friends  with  the  Lithuanians.  But  they  have  stood  behind  the 
high-handed  seizure  of  the  capital  of  Lithuania,  and,  instead  of  disavow- 
ing the  outlawed  general,  they  have  made  his  military  adventure  the 
basis  of  bargaining  with  the  League  of  Nations  for  additional  territory 
at  the  expense  of  Lithuania. 


The  League  of  Nations. 

The  attitude  of  the  League  of  Nations  towards  Lithuania  is  most 
disheartening.  It  proves  that  the  Council  of  the  League  is  not  an 
impartial  body,  dispensing  justice  among  nations  for  the  common  good 
of  all,  but  a  group  of  statesmen  furthering  special  interests.  Decisions 
of  the  League  are  being  made  on  the  principle  of  do  iit  des.  The  dispute 
between  Lithuania,  the  victim,  and  Poland,  the  aggressor,  is  not  decided 
according  to  its  merits,  but  is  one  small  pawn  in  the  game  of  compromise 
between  France,  Great  Britain,  and  the  other  states, 


48 

Zellgouski's  Raid. 

The  facts  of  the  case  are  these.  When  the  League  of  Nations  took 
over  the  adjudication  of  the  frontier  between  Poland  and  Lithuania,  both 
countries  agreed  to  an  armistice,  and  the  line  between  the  opposing 
armies  was  settled  by  the  League  of  Nations.  Within  a  month  after 
this  agreement  was  signed,  the  Poles  violated  the  armistice,  made  a 
surprise  attack,  and  in  a  few  days  not  only  occupied  the  disputed  frontier 
territory,  but  went  a  long  distance  beyond  and  seized  the  capital  of 
Lithuania. 

Proposed  Plebiscite. 

The  methodical  preparations  for  this  move  had  long  been  observed 
by  the  Lithuanians,  but  when  Mr.  Voldemar  pointed  out  to  the  Council 
of  the  League  that  Poland  was  preparing  to  anticipate  by  violence  the 
award,  he  was  assured  that  this  would  not  be  allowed.  After  the  coup, 
the  Lithuanian  Government  received  no  satisfaction  from  the  Council. 
The  Polish  Government  denied  responsibility  for  Zellgouski,  and  claimed 
that  the  army  of  General  Zellgouski  was  composed  of  men  from  the 
disputed  territory.  The  League  of  Nations  finally  agreed  to  settle  the 
matter  by  means  of  a  plebiscite,  but  including  in  the  plebiscite  area  the 
district  of  Vilna,  capital  of  Lithuania!  To  guarantee  a  fair  vote,  the 
plebiscite  area  was  to  be  occupied  by  an  international  body  of  troops. 
But  in  the  meantime.  General  Zellgouski  has  reigned  supreme,  encour- 
aged by  Poland  and  reaping  the  rewards  of  his  defiance  of  the  League 
of  Nations.    He  is  "preparing"  the  country  he  occupies  for  the  plebiscite ! 

Russia's  Attitude. 

Russia  has  now  intervened  in  the  question.  This  was  to  be  expected. 
Russia's  rights  and  interests  in  the  relations  between  Poland  and  Lithu- 
ania are  far  more  important  than  the  League  of  Nations.  We  might  say, 
in  fact,  that  it  was  folly  on  the  part  of  the  League  of  Nations  to  believe 
that  any  territorial  matters  of  this  sort  could  be  settled  without  con- 
sulting Russia.  Russia  hf>.s  treaties  of  peace  with  both  the  Poles  and  the 
Lithuanians.  Her  Government  is  virtually  at  war  with  the  Govern- 
ments controlling  the  League  of  Nations.  These  Governments  have  been 
doing  all  in  their  power  for  several  years  to  destroy  the  present  Russian 
Government.  Russia,  therefore,  declares  that  the  League  of  Nations 
has  no  business  interfering  in  matters  that  concern  her  and  her  neigh- 
bors, with  whom  she  is  at  peace.  The  terms  of  the  treaties  between 
Russia  and  Poland  and  Lithuania  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  League 
of  Nations,  and  their  interpretation  and  execution  is  a  matter  of  direct 
negotiation  between  Russia  and  her  neighbors, 


49 

Consequently  Russia  has  served  notice  on  Poland  that  the  presence 
of  the  Zellgouski  troops  in  Lithuania,  beyond  the  lines  agreed  upon  in 
the  Treaty  of  Riga,  is  a  violation  of  that  treaty,  and  that  Poland  must 
withdraw  her  troops.  If  Poland  disavows  General  Zellgouski  as  a  rebel 
over  whom  she  has  no  control,  Russia  feels  that  she  is  free  to  act,  and, 
since  Poland  has  disavowed  Zellgouski,  whatever  the  Russians  do  to 
him  will  not  of  course  affect  the  friendlj'^  relations  between  Russia  and 
Poland!  T  "^ 

At  the  same  time,  the  Russian  Government  has  warned  Lithuania 
that  the  presence  of  troops  of  the  League  of  Nations  will  not  be  tolerated 
in  the  proposed  plebiscite  area.  Russia  points  out  that  the  experiences 
of  the  past  few  years  have  given  her  reason  to  be  suspicious  of  a  new 
intervention  in  her  internal  affairs,  and  that  the  presence  of  foreign 
troops  at  Vilna  is  a  menace  to  the  security  of  Russia. 

United  States  Must  Take  Definite  Stand. 

Russian  intervention  and  the  quarrel  between  Poland  and  Lithuania 
makes  it  necessary  for  the  League  of  Nations  and  the  United  States  to 
take  a  definite  stand  on  the  question  of  the  recognition  of  the  Lithuanian 
Government.  Either  Lithuania  is  a  province  of  Russia  or  she  is  an 
independent  country. 

Lithuania  Not  a  Province  of  Russia. 

If  Lithuania  is  a  province  of  Russia,  the  de  facto  Russian  Govern- 
ment is  justified  in  intervening  in  the  Vilna  dispute  to  prevent  Poland, 
with  or  without  the  help  of  the  League  of  Nations  from  alienating  terri- 
tory from  the  Russian  Empire.  Such  action  is  in  accordance  with  the 
Colby  note  of  August  10, 1920,  and  should  receive  sympathy  and  support 
from  those  who  believe  in  maintaining  the  integrity  of  the  Russian 
Empire.  For  in  this  case  Lenine  is  not  acting  as  a  Rolshevist,  but  as  a 
patriotic  Russian,  to  defeat  a  scheme  of  Poland,  with  foreign  aid,  for 
grabbing  more  Russian  territory.  If  Lithuania  is  a  province  of  Russia, 
the  League  of  Nations  certainly  has  no  right  to  adjudicate  the  dispute 
between  the  Poles  and  the  Lithuanians.  The  signature  of  the  Lithuanian 
Government  to  whatever  compromise  the  League  of  Nations  suggests 
would  have  no  value! 

Why  Not  Recognize  Lithuania? 

But  if  Lithuania  is  an  independent  nation,  what  reason  is  there  for 
withholding  formal  recognition  of  that  independence?  And  if  the 
League  of  Nations  still  insists  upon  the  Lithuanian  Government  receiv- 
ing the  international  troops  for  the  purpose  of  a  plebiscite,  it  is  only  fair 
to  admit  Lithuania  to  membership  in  the  League  of  Nations,  to  accord 


50 

her  equal  rights  and  an  equal  opportunity  for  justice  with  Poland,  and, 
above  all,  to  be  ready  to  defend  Lithuania  against  the  threatened  in- 
vasion of  a  soviet  army.  Moscow  is  simply  asking  the  world  to  state 
what  it  intends  to  do  in  regard  to  Lithuania.  If  the  world  yields  to  the 
threat  of  Lenine,  abandons  the  idea  of  occupying  (and  defending!) 
Vilna,  and  lets  both  Poles  and  Russians  use  unchallenged  the  argument 
of  force  in  relation  to  Lithuania,  is  not  the  League  of  Nations  a  farce? 
And  what  can  we  call  the  policy  of  the  Wilson  administration  towards 
Lithuania  ? 


PLEA  OF  HON.  WALTER  M.  CHANDLER,  FOR  RECOGNITION 
OF  LITHUANIA,  LATVIA  AND  ESTHONIA,  PRE- 
SENTED TO  THE  SECRETARY  OF  STATE, 

MAY  16,  1921 

Mr.  Secretary,  I  wish  to  present  at  this  time  facts  and  arguments  in 
favor  of  the  recognition  by  the  United  States  of  America  of  the  independ- 
ence de  jure  of  the  Baltic  Republics  of  Esthonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania: 

The  great  war  brought  about  a  new  era  in  this  history  of  mankind. 
It  recast  the  map  of  the  earth  and  created  a  new  political  world  for 
the  human  race. 

The  group  of  men  who  composed  the  peace  conference  at  Paris, 
in  reconstructing  the  map  of  the  world  and  in  determining  the  rights 
of  peoples  with  reference  to  the  boundaries  then  created,  were  guided 
by  certain  well-known  political  principles.  These  principles  were  rep- 
resented, in  part,  by  the  theories  of  President  Wilson  in  his  famous 
fourteen  points. 

Self-Determination. 

One  of  these  points  related  to  the  so-called  doctrine  of  self-deter- 
mination, a  doctrine  first  proclaimed  on  this  continent  by  Thomas 
Jefferson  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  when  he  declared  that 
all  just  powers  of  government  were  derived  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  and  later  beautifully  described  by  Lincoln  in  his  Gettysburg 
address  as  "government  of  the  people,  by  the  people  and  for  the  people." 

By  self-determination  is  meant,  as  I  understand  it,  that  any  con- 
siderable group  of  people  having  a  proper  physical  basis  of  territory 
and  population,  with  certain  national  earmarks  or  characteristics  of 
race,  language,  and  religion,  can  claim  this  right  of  self-determination, 
provided  a  jjroper  educational  basis  of  citizenship  can  be  shown,  and 
provided  further,  that  many  years  of  oppression  have  been  exercised 
by  the  dominating  power  over  the  smaller  power  seeking  separation 
and  claiming  rights  of  self-determination  and  independence. 

Bases  for  Independence. 

It  quite  naturally  follows,  then,  that  the  small  nation  that  asserts 
independence  and  claims  rights  of  self-determination,  in  the  reconstruc- 
tion of  the  map  of  the  earth  after  the  Great  World  War,  must  show  the 
existence  of  four  essential  concurring  elements: 


52 

(1)  The  requisite  physical  basis  of  geography,  territory,  and  popu- 
lation, 

(2)  Certain  well-defined  distinctions  in  blood,  language,  and  religion 
that  differentiate  its  people  radically  from  the  people  of  the  larger 
nation  from  whom  separation  is  sought. 

(3)  An  educational  basis  of  citizenship  that  justifies  the  enjoyment 
of  rights  of  self-determination  and  independence. 

(4)  Governmental  oppression,  extending  over  decades  or  centuries, 
exercised  by  a  larger  over  a  small  nation,  rendering  self-determination 
by  the  smaller  nation  a  supreme  necessity. 

Now,  it  is  easily  demonstrable  that  all  these  conditions  and  char- 
acteristics exist  in  the  history  of  the  Baltic  Republics  of  Esthonia,  Latvia, 
and  Lithuania.  Let  us  consider  briefly  each  of  the  above  subdivisions 
in  order. 


Areas  and  Populations. 

(1)  The  extent  of  the  areas  of  the  Baltic  States  with  reference  to 
rights  of  self-determination  and  independence. 

The  following  tables  of  comparative  statistics  furnish  satisfactory 
proof  on  this  point: 

(A)  Baltic  Group 

Area.  Population. 
Square  miles. 

Esthonia  16,500  1,750,000 

Latvia    24,442  2,552,000 

Lithuania   30,500  4,500,000 

(B)   Group  of  Other  Independent  States 

Holland 12,648  6,114,000 

Belgium    11,373  7,633,000 

Denmark    15,388  2,772,000 

Switzerland  15,976  3,780,000 

Greece  41,690  4,363,000 

Montenegro   5,570  516,000 

Norway 124,860  2,392,000 

An  examination  of  these  tables  will  show  that  all  of  the  Baltic 
States,  Esthonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania,  are  larger  in  territory  than 
Holland,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Switzerland,  and  Montenegro.  It  will  also 
show  that  both  Latvia  and  Lithuania  are  greater  in  population  than 
Montenegro  and  Norway,  and  that  the  population  of  Lithuania  is  greater, 
as  her  territory  is  larger,  than  that  of  Denmark  and  Montenegro 
combined. 

•  It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  first  essential  of  the  right  of  self- 
determination,  a  proper  physical  basis  of  territory  and  population,  is 


53 

undeniably  present  in  the  case  of  all  the  Baltic  States.  Everything, 
great  or  small,  good  or  bad,  right  or  wrong,  must  be  measured  by 
standards  of  comparison  and  contrast.  Every  little  patch  of  land  and 
every  little  handful  of  people  can  not  assert  independence  and  reason- 
ably expect  recognition  from  larger  nations  having  greater  geographical 
units  and  more  numerous  populations.  But  unless  we  are  prepared  to 
deny  rights  of  independence  to  Holland,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Switzer- 
land, Norway,  Montenegro,  and  Greece,  we  must  grant  that  Esthonia, 
Latvia,  and  Lithuania  are  as  well  qualified  by  the  proper  standard  of 
physical  comparison  to  be  free  and  independent  as  they. 

Bigness  is  Not  Greatness. 

While  a  certain  extent  of  territory  is  necessary  as  an  element  of 
the  right  of  self-determination,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  neither 
liberty  nor  civilization  can  be  gauged  by  acres  of  land  or  by  density 
of  population.  The  greatest  and  freest  peoples  of  the  earth,  as  well 
as  the  noblest  civilizations  of  all  the  centuries,  have  lived  and  thrived 
upon  small  and  barren  tracts  of  land.  The  most  gifted  of  all  the 
ancient  races  were,  perhaps,  the  Hebrews  and  the  Greeks.  Around  the 
civilizations  of  Palestine  and  of  Greece  have  circled  all  the  other  high 
civilizations  of  the  world.  The  Hebrews  were  the  master  builders  of 
the  great  spiritual  temple  of  the  human  race,  whose  corner  stone  is 
Hebrew  prophecy  and  whose  gorgeous  domes  are  the  claims  of  Jesus 
and  Mahomet  to  the  Messiahship  of  God.  The  Greeks  surpassed  all 
mankind,  ancient  or  modern,  in  the  variety  and  grandeur  of  intellectual 
triumph,  and  today,  among  the  ruins  and  wrecks  of  their  genius,  the 
modern  world  still  wanders  to  contemplate,  admire,  and  study,  the  pride 
of  every  master  and  the  perfection  of  every  model. 

And  yet  both  Hebrews  and  Greeks  inhabited  comparatively  barren 
stretches  of  land,  not  as  large  nor  as  fertile  as  Lithuania;  for  it  must 
be  remembered  that  Palestine  has  only  13,724  square  miles,  a  territorj' 
smaller  than  that  of  either  Esthonia  or  Latvia. 

Blood,  Language  and  Religion. 

(2)  Let  us  now  consider  the  second  element  above  mentioned  of  the 
right  of  self-determination;  that  is — 

Certain  well-defined  distinctions  in  blood,  language,  and  religion 
that  differentiate  its  people  radically  from  the  people  of  the  larger 
nation  from  whom  separation  is  sought. 

This  element  is  also  very  clear  and  well  defined  in  the  claims  of  all 
the  Baltic  States  to  rights  of  self-determination. 

The  racial  and  religious  differences  between  Esthonians,  Letts,  and 
Lithuanians,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Bussians  on  the  other,  are  as  radical 


54 

as  those  between  Germans  and  Russians,  or  between  Englishmen  and 
Frenchmen. 

The  Esthonians  are  Finns  in  blood;  the  Russians  are  Slavs.  The 
Esthonians  are  Finnish  in  language;  the  Russians  are  Slavic.  The 
Esthonians  are  Lutheran  in  religion;  the  Russians  are  Orthodox  Greek 
Catholics. 

The  Letts  and  Lithuanians  are  Indo-Europeans  in  blood  and  lan- 
guage; the  Russians  are  Slavs.  The  Letts  are  overwhelmingly  Lutheran, 
and  the  Lithuanians  are  overwhelmingly  Roman  Catholics,  while  the 
Russians  are  overwhelmingly  Orthodox  Greek  Catholics. 

In  each  of  the  Baltic  States  the  language  both  of  the  Government  and 
the  people  is  the  mother  tongue,  which  is  spoken  and  written  by  a  vast 
majority  of  the  population. 

In  short,  a  pure  strain  of  Finnish  blood  flows  through  the  veins  of 
Esthonians,  as  an  almost  pure  Finnish  language  is  spoken  by  them,  while 
a  pure  strain  of  Indo-European  blood  flows  through  the  veins  of  Letts 
and  Lithuanians,  at  the  same  time  that  an  almost  pure  Indo-European 
language  is  spoken  by  them,  proving  a  radical  difference  in  blood  and 
language  between  the  peoples  of  all  the  Baltic  States  and  those  of  Slavic 
Russia. 

Race  Prejudice. 

The  logic  and  philosophy  at  the  foundation  of  this  second  element 
of  the  right  of  self-determination  as  a  reason  and  requirement  for 
separate  national  life  are  to  be  found  in  the  experiences  and  observa- 
tions of  mankind,  that  race  and  religious  differences  breed  strife  among 
nations,  resulting  in  bloodshed  and  in  warfare.  The  reason  of  the 
principle  and  the  cause  of  the  trouble  are  found  deeply  imbedded  in 
human  nature  and  in  the  bias  and  prejudices  of  men.  We  like  our 
"kith  and  kin"  and  are  naturally  disposed  to  regard  strangers  with 
distrust,  if  not  with  positive  dislike.  Deadly  feuds  are  born  of  the  loves 
and  hatreds  of  the  clans,  and  race  prejudice  and  tribal  impulse  are  the 
most  powerful  of  the  motives  of  men. 

Education  and  Culture. 

(3)  I  come  now  to  discuss  the  third  element,  namely: 
An  educational  and  cultural  status  that  justifies  the  privilege  and 
the  enjoyment  of  the  right  of  self-determination. 

This  element  is  absolutely  necessary  in  appealing  to  the  nations 
of  the  earth  for  recognition.  However  extensive  the  territory  and  how- 
ever numerous  the  people,  illiterate  barbarians  can  not  reasonably  ex- 
pect recognition  of  their  independence  from  literate  and  civilized  races. 
The  ability  to  be  self-governing  must  be  shown  in  order  to  claim  self- 


55 

government,  and  the  ability  to  be  self-governing  is  impossible  without 
a  certain  degree  of  educational  and  cultural  development  and  achieve- 
ment. 

This  third  element  of  the  right  of  self-government  is  conspicuously 
present  in  the  history,  life  and  civilization  of  the  peoples  of  all  the 
Baltic  States.  There  is  practically  no  illiteracy  among  them.  The  man 
or  woman  of  adult  years  in  Esthonia,  Latvia,  or  Lithuania  who  can 
not  read  or  write  is  usually  a  mental  delinquent,  a  lunatic,  or  an  idiot. 

The  extraordinarily  high  rate  of  literacy  in  the  Baltic  countries  is 
really  astonishing  when  we  consider  that  just  across  the  border  in 
Russia  the  population  is  70  per  cent  illiterate,  by  conservative  estimate, 
and  is  placed  by  many  writers  as  high  as  80  per  cent. 

University  Education. 

In  university  as  well  as  in  common-school  education  the  populations 
of  Esthonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania  are  remarkably  advanced.  The  fol- 
lowing comparative  statistics  in  university  education  are  illustrative. 
The  university  students  of  Latvia  in  1913,  the  year  before  the  war,  were 
by  comparison  as  follows: 

University  Students 

Latvia  1,950 

Denmark    1,460 

Norway 1,400 

Sweden  1,200 

Portugal   1,150 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  although  her  population  is  smaller  than 
that  of  either  Denmark,  Sweden,  or  Portugal,  the  number  of  university 
students  of  Latvia  is  numerically  greater,  and  what  is  true  of  Latvia  in 
university  education  is  equally  true  of  Esthonia  and  Lithuania. 

Personal  Observation. 

I  beg  you  to  pardon  me  for  personal  reference  to  myself  and  to 
what  I  have  recently  done  and  seen  and  heard  in  this  connection.  In 
the  summer  of  1919  and  again  in  January,  February,  and  March  of  this 
year  I  visited  all  the  Baltic  countries  and  traveled  extensively  through 
them  by  train  and  automobile.  I  was  astonished  at  the  high-grade 
civilization  of  the  masses  of  the  people  and  at  the  fine  accomplishments 
and  brilliant  educations  of  the  public  men  with  whom  I  met.  At  Reval, 
at  Kovno,  and  at  Riga,  the  capitals,  respectively,  of  Esthonia,  Lithuania, 
and  Latvia,  I  was  honored  by  being  the  invited  guest  at  public  dinners 
given  by  ministers  of  state.  I  was  surprised  and  pleased  to  learn  that 
all  of  these  statesmen  were  university  graduates  and  that  most  of  them 
spoke  several  languages,  including  English,  fluently. 


56 

Culture  Among  Peasants. 

Any  doubt  as  to  the  educational  qualifications  of  all  the  Baltic 
Republics  for  self-determination  and  independence  will  be  removed 
by  a  short  visit  to  these  countries.  The  visitor  will  find  peasant  popu- 
lations with  books,  periodicals,  magazines,  and  musical  instruments  in 
the  home,  and,  to  his  amazement,  he  will  find  that  a  considerable  per- 
centage of  the  people  of  Esthonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania  speak  three 
languages — German,  Russian,  and  their  mother  tongue — and  that  they 
are  somewhat  familiar  with  the  history  and  literature  of  the  countries 
of  these  languages. 

Of  all  the  elements  that  form  a  just  basis  of  claims  to  rights  of  self- 
government  and  independence  among  the  Baltic  peoples,  the  test  of 
literacy  is  the  greatest,  for  the  thirst  of  Esthonians,  Letts,  and  Lithu- 
anians for  knowledge  and  education  is  as  unquenchable  as  their  thirst 
for  freedom  is  unconquerable. 

Russian  Oppression  of  Baltic  Peoples. 

(4)  Permit  me,  if  you  please,  at  this  time  to  discuss  the  fourth 
element  of  the  right  of  self-determination  above  mentioned,  namely: 

Governmental  oppression,  extending  over  decades  or  centuries,  exer- 
cised by  a  larger  over  a  smaller  nation,  rendering  self-determination  by 
the  smaller  nation  a  supreme  necessity. 

It  seems  quite  unnecessary  to  discuss  this  element  or  phase  of  the 
subject  at  any  length.  All  men  are  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  history 
of  Russian  cruelty  and  oppression.  Scholars  of  every  nation  know  well 
the  details  of  Russian  tyranny  and  persecution.  Siberian  dungeons  have 
been  the  horror  and  the  nightmare  of  Russian  freedom  in  every  age. 
Not  only  nihilists  and  anarchists,  who  deserved  incarceration,  but  patri- 
ots and  freemen  who  thirsted  and  fought  for  liberty  spent  wretched  lives 
and  met  horrible  deaths  within  them. 

A  Policy  of  Tyranny. 

Russian  history  is  replete  with  instances  of  governmental  cruelty 
and  oppression.  Russian  imperial  administrative  affairs  were  simply 
records  of  revolting  and  horrible  stifling  of  man's  natural  cravings  and 
struggles  for  freedom.  Other  nations — Greece,  Rome,  Spain,  France, 
and  England — have  had  periods  of  despotic  sway.  Russia  has  been 
uniformly  the  land  of  barbarism  and  illiteracy,  of  tyranny  and  oppres- 
sion. This  tyranny  and  oppression  have  been  dealt  out  not  only  to 
Letts,  Esthonians,  and  Lithuanians  but  to  the  Russians  themselves.  Slavs 
as  well  as  Finns  and  Indo-Europeans  have  been  the  barbarized  and 
persecuted  victims  of  the  Russian  imperial  system  of  government.    The 


57 

fixed  and  unalterable  policy  of  that  Government  was  to  hold  in  ignorance 
and  abject  slavery  the  masses  of  the  Russian  population,  trusting  to 
this  method  of  government  to  destroy  the  aspirations  for  freedom  that 
are  natural  to  men. 

Soviet  Rule. 

When  we  turn  from  the  regime  of  the  Czar  to  the  rule  of  the  soviet, 
we  find  neither  hope  nor  consolation.  We  have  simply  passed  from  one 
gloomy  prison  dungeon  to  another.  Both  are  monumental,  pyramidal 
tyrannies,  and  of  the  two  the  reign  of  Nicholas  would  be  preferable  to 
the  rule  of  Lenin  and  Trotski,  for  the  absolutism  of  an  aristocracy  is 
better  than  the  despotism  of  the  proletariat. 

In  other  words  and  in  short,  Esthonians,  Letts,  and  Lithuanians  can 
not  and  will  not  consent  to  enter  into  political  union  with  Russians  under 
any  known  form  of  Russian  government  that  history  presents. 

Russian  "Unity." 

Russian  tyranny  and  oppression  was  born  of  the  design  and  deter- 
mination of  the  Russian  clergy  and  Government  to  reduce  to  one  homo- 
geneous whole  the  heterogeneous  masses  and  nationalities  of  the  various 
peoples  and  races  of  the  Russian  Empire.  One  Czar,  one  Orthodox 
Catholic  faith,  one  Russian  language  was  the  slogan  of  all  the  Russian 
priests  and  statesmen,  and  from  this  policy  of  amalgamation  proceeded 
centuries  of  discrimination,  persecution,  and  mean  oppression.  The  idea 
of  one  Czar  caused  the  attempt  to  suppress  tribal  impulse  and  the  aspira- 
tions of  distinct  races  for  self-government  and  independence.  The  idea 
of  one  Orthodox  Catholic  faith  caused  religious  persecution  out  of 
which  came  the  most  bitter  of  all  revolt.  The  idea  of  one  Russian 
language  caused  the  attempt  to  suppress  the  mother  tongues  of  the 
Esthonians,  Letts,  Lithuanians,  and  other  non-Russian  nationalities,  and 
this  in  every  age  has  been  a  mean  form  of  persecution,  for  the  love  of 
the  mother  tongue  is  second  only  to  the  love  of  the  mother  herself  or  to 
that  of  God  and  country. 

Suppression  of  Languages. 

A  peculiar  form  of  Russian  malignity  and  persecution,  in  the  matter 
of  attempted  suppression  of  language,  took  place  in  the  year  1864,  when 
Muravjev  prohibited  the  publication  of  anything  in  the  Lithuanian 
language  and  in  Latin  characters.  The  compulsory  use  of  Russian  letter- 
ing in  the  publication  of  books  and  papers  in  Lithuania  was  intended 
to  destroy  gradually  all  knowledge  of  the  mother  tongue  of  Lithuanians. 

When  the  Letts  demanded  judges  with  a  knowledge  of  their  own 


58 

language  the  Russians  replied  by  forbidding  such  judges  to  use  the 
Lettish  language. 

When  Esthonians  and  Letts  demanded  a  voice  in  the  solution  of  the 
agrarian  problem  in  accordance  with  modern  notions  of  right  and 
justice,  the  Russians  replied  by  extending  sjTnpathy  and  aid  to  the 
German  Raltic  barons,  and,  to  aggravate  the  matter,  brought  Russian 
colonists  from  the  interior  of  Russia  to  colonize  Esthonia  and  Latvia. 

Innumerable  forms  of  Russian  tyranny  and  oppression  might  be 
mentioned,  but  it  is  considered  that  sufiicient  has  been  said  as  a  matter 
of  illustration. 

Up  to  this  moment  I  have  discussed  the  subject  of  the  recognition 
of  the  independence  of  the  Baltic  peoples  from  the  viewpoint  of  certain 
cardinal  elements  of  the  right  of  self-government;  that  is,  extent  of 
territory  and  population,  race  and  religious  differences,  educational 
status,  and  long-continued  oppression. 


Economic  Bases  of  Baltic  States. 

I  come  now  to  discuss  the  economic,  industrial,  and  agricultural  life 
of  these  countries  as  a  secondary,  but  nevertheless  very  essential,  ele- 
ment of  the  claim  to  recognition  of  independence  by  the  nations  of  the 
world.  Indeed,  this  element  is  given  primary  consideration  by  many 
writers  upon  the  subject  of  the  justice  and  advisability  of  recognizing 
the  independent  national  existence  of  the  newly  created  non-Russian 
republics  of  the  former  Russian  Empire.  It  is  contended  by  some  of 
these  writers  that  Latvia,  Esthonia,  and  Lithuania  are  too  weak  and 
undeveloped  economically,  industrially,  and  agriculturally  to  maintain 
separate  and  independent  stations  among  the  nations  of  the  earth.  It 
is  further  asserted  by  them  that  to  recognize  the  independence  of  these 
little  States  would  be  to  create  permanently  dependent  communities 
whose  helplessness  would  make  them  perpetual  wards  of  the  larger 
nations.  This  is  the  chief  contention  of  the  advocates  of  a  reunited  and 
federated  Russia. 

Facts  and  figures,  however,  and  especially  comparative  statistics, 
negative  completely  the  idea  that  these  countries  are  not  fitted  econ- 
omically for  separate  and  independent  life.  It  can  be  easily  shown  that 
other  nations  less  strong  and  well  developed  economically,  commercially, 
and  agriculturally  have  maintained  centuries  of  separate  national 
existence.  Unfortunately,  however,  the  time  allotted  to  me  does  not 
permit  an  elaboration  of  argument  from  statistics.  I  have  time  to 
suggest  only  one  illustration  of  the  economic  strength  of  the  Baltic 
countries. 


59 

Revenues  in  1913. 

I  respectfully  submit  on  this  point  that  the  revenue-producing 
powers  of  a  country,  under  normal  conditions  of  equitable  taxation, 
give  a  most  satisfactory  idea  of  the  economic  strength  of  that  country. 

In  1913,  the  year  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  when  conditions 
were  normal,  Esthonia,  the  smallest  and  poorest  of  the  Baltic  Republics, 
paid  50,000,000  rubles  into  the  Russian  treasury.  This  money  paid  all 
the  expenses  of  her  local  government  and  left  a  balance,  a  net  deposit 
of  5,000,000  rubles  for  the  benefit  of  some  other  Provinces  of  the  Russian 
Empire  that  showed  a  deficit.  Esthonia  being  the  smallest  and  poorest, 
this  fact  alone  is  proof  of  the  economic  abilities  of  all  the  non-Russian 
Republics  to  be  self-sustaining  under  an  independent  regime. 

Nevertheless,  it  may  be  mentioned  as  additional  proof  that  Latvia, 
in  1913,  produced  88,054,576  rubles  revenue;  that  the  grand  total  of  her 
local  provincial  expenses  in  that  year  were  54,324,205  rubles,  leaving  a 
net  revenue  amounting  to  33,730,371  rubles  to  be  sent  to  the  Imperial 
Russian  treasury. 

Lithuania's  Revenues. 

As  still  further  illustration  and  proof,  permit  me  to  say  that  in  the 
same  year,  1913,  Lithuania  raised  a  national  or,  rather,  provincial 
revenue  of  55,000,000  rubles,  and  spent  some  20,000,000  rubles  in  her 
local  government,  according  to  a  statement  furnished  me  by  Mr.  J. 
Vileisis,  former  minister  of  finance  of  the  Republic  of  Lithuania.  It 
will  thus  be  seen  that  Lithuania  sent,  in  the  year  preceding  the  war, 
35,000,000  rubles  as  a  contribution  to  the  Imperial  Russian  treasury  to 
help  pay  the  expenses  of  less-favored  portions  of  the  Empire. 

I  respectfully  submit  that  these  facts  and  figures  furnish  indubitable 
proof  that  these  little  countries  could  each  maintain  the  government 
of  an  independent  republic  at  home  and  sustain  all  necessary  diplomatic 
offices  abroad. 

Objections  Answered. 

The  contentions  therefore  made  in  behalf  of  the  independence  of 
the  little  republics  have  been  affirmative.  Certain  negative  considera- 
tions or  objections  should  be  noted  at  this  time. 

Inexperience  in  Government. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  contended  that  the  peoples  of  these  non- 
Russian  republics  are  not  fitted  for  self-government  because  they  have 
had  no  experience;  because  it  would  be  like  sending  out  little  children 
into  the  world  without  training  and  guidance.    This  is  worse  than  foolish. 


60 

for  it  flies  completely  in  the  face  of  the  history  and  the  essential  con- 
ditions of  the  lives  of  nations  and  of  men.  No  great  nation  of  this  earth 
ever  began  national  existence  with  finished  experience.  The  history 
of  mankind  shows  no  graduate  or  postgraduate  nations  from  birth. 
Each  and  all  have  been  compelled  to  tread  the  bitter  pathway  of  suffer- 
ing, self-development,  self-denial,  and  individual  experiment.  Every 
great  man  of  eminence  of  the  earth  of  any  calling  or  profession  lias 
had  to  have  his  beginning  and  his  individual  experience. 


The  American  Colonies. 

At  the  time  of  the  American  Revolution  it  was  contended  by  the 
enemies  of  America  in  England  that  the  colonists  were  not  fitted  for 
self-government.  William  Pitt,  Earl  of  Chatham,  defended  them  most 
brilliantly  in  Parliament  against  this  charge.  With  superb  eloquence 
he  declared  that  he  had  studied  the  political  masterpieces  of  antiquity 
and  of  modern  times  and  that  he  had  never  read  finer  productions  of 
statesmanship  than  had  been  sent  overseas  from  America  to  England 
by  the  inexperienced  colonial  statesmen — Jeft'erson,  Madison,  and  Ham- 
ilton. And  yet  today  we  have  what  Americans  believe  to  be  the  greatest 
and  mightiest  of  all  Republics  of  the  earth,  and  when  we  Americans 
make  speeches  in  Congress  we  support  our  arguments  by  citations  from 
the  words  and  deeds  of  these  inexperienced  colonial  master  builders  of 
the  early  Republic. 


Statesmen  of  Baltic  Republics. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  it  can  not  be  truthfully  contended 
that  the  statesmen  of  these  little  countries  have  not  had  considerable 
experience  and  have  not  demonstrated  the  finest  qualities  of  statesman- 
ship under  the  most  trying  circumstances.  About  three  years  have 
elapsed  since  they  separately  declared  their  independence.  During  that 
time  they  have  adopted  constitutions,  organized  stable  governments, 
with  cabinets  of  ministers,  and  with  national  assemblies.  They  have 
organized  and  outfitted  splendid  young  armies  that  have  already  given 
a  fine  account  of  themselves  upon  the  battlefield.  The  deliberations 
and  official  conduct  of  their  ministers  have  been  marked  in  all  things 
by  ability  and  conservatism.  Their  national  assemblies  have  acted  with 
wisdom  in  most  cases  and  have  as  yet  enacted  no  foolish  or  extremely 
radical  legislation.  Civil  and  religious  liberty  and  the  sacred  rights  of 
private  property  are  everywhere  to  be  found  in  the  provisions  of  their 
constitutions  and  in  the  enactments  of  their  national  parliaments. 


61 

Personal  Recollections. 

It  is  now  and  will  always  be  a  matter  of  pride  and  pleasure  that  I 
have  met  and  known  the  leading  statesmen  of  the  Baltic  Republics. 
Many  of  them  I  met  at  Paris  in  the  summer  of  1919  during  the  sessions 
of  the  peace  conference.  Others  I  met  in  the  capitals  of  their  countries. 
All  of  them  are,  without  exception,  brainy  and  accomplished  men,  and 
I  never  talked  to  one  of  them  that  I  did  not  think  of  the  remark  of  one 
of  the  European  diplomats,  referring  to  Venizelos,  of  Greece,  that  the 
small  nations  of  Europe  had  furnished  to  the  conference  at  Paris  its 
gi'eatest  statesmen. 

Esthoniaun  Leaders. 

At  Paris  I  met  Antoine  Piip,  present  minister  of  foreign  affairs  of 
Esthonia,  a  young,  grave,  serious,  and  accomplished  man,  who  was 
formerly  professor  of  international  law  at  the  University  of  Petrograd. 

Afterwards,  at  Reval,  I  met  Konstantin  Patz,  who  is  now  president 
of  the  constituent  assembly  and  virtual  head  of  the  Republic  of  Esthonia. 
Patz  is  a  writer  and  lawyer  of  distinction,  who  has  translated  the  Consti- 
tution of  the  United  States  into  the  Esthonian  language  for  the  benefit  of 
his  countrymen.  His  life's  history  has  a  deep  touch  and  coloring  of  the 
high  heroic  and  of  martyrdom,  for  he  spent  many  months  in  prison  and 
was  once  condemned  to  death  for  his  supreme  devotion  to  the  cause  of 
the  liberty  and  independence  of  his  country.  While  at  Reval  I  met  other 
able  ministers  of  state  of  Esthonia,  among  them  Otto  Strandman,  prime 
minister,  and  Gen.  Laidoner,  minister  of  war. 

Lithuanians. 

At  Kovno,  the  temporary  capital  of  Lithuania,  I  had  the  pleasure  of 
meeting  Stulginskis,  president  of  the  constituent  assembly  and  the  recog- 
nized head  of  the  Republic  of  Lithuania.  One  of  my  most  pleasant 
and  interesting  experiences  in  Europe  was  to  listen  to  Stulginskis  address 
the  national  assembly  on  the  occasion  of  the  celebration  of  the  third 
anniversary  of  Lithuanian  independence.  At  Kovno  I  also  met  Grinius, 
prime  minister,  and  Purickis,  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  of  Lithuania. 
Purickis  is  a  Roman  Catholic  priest  of  great  learning  and  piety  and 
intensely  devoted  to  his  country. 

Latvians. 

At  Riga  it  was  my  great  pleasure  and  privilege  to  meet  the  leading 
Latvian  statesmen.  I  met  Tschakste,  president  of  the  constituent  as- 
sembly and  titular  chief  of  the  Latvian  State,  a  venerable  and  accom- 
plished man,  whose  great  good  nature  and  merry  twinkle  of  the  eye 


62 

endear  him  to  all  who  know  him.  I  also  met  Meierovics,  minister  of 
foreign  affairs  of  Latvia,  a  youth  in  years  but  a  veteran  in  statesmanship 
and  diplomacy,  a  man  of  fine  accomplishments  and  wonderfully  pleasing 
personality.  It  was  my  good  fortune,  also,  to  meet  Ulmanis,  prime 
minister  of  Latvia,  a  big,  brave,  brainy  man,  a  rugged  patriot  who  loves 
Latvia  as  Macaulay  says  Pitt  loved  England,  as  an  Athenian  loved 
Athens,  as  a  Roman  loved  the  city  of  Seven  Hills. 

Builders  of  New  Governments. 

All  these  men  are  university  graduates  and  have  had  wide  political 
experience  under  the  Imperial  Government  of  Russia  and  later  as 
founders  and  builders  of  their  own  Republics.  And  I  want  to  assure 
you  that  I  have  little  patience  with  the  views  of  those  who  contend  that 
such  men  are  inexperienced  and  incompetent,  and  that  the  destinies 
of  the  Baltic  Republics  are  not  safe  in  their  hands.  I  wish,  further,  to 
say  that  it  would  be  decidedly  ungenerous  to  judge  these  statesmen  of 
Esthonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania,  or  their  early  Governments,  by  the 
records  of  a  few  short  years  immediately  following  a  great  and  paralyz- 
ing war,  and  without  any  recognition  of  their  independence  whatever 
from  the  nations  of  the  earth.  It  would  be  just  as  generous  to  chain  a 
man  hand  and  foot  and  then  command  him  to  run  and  condemn  him 
because  he  could  not. 

Russia  Can  Not  Govern  Baltic  States. 

In  this  connection  it  may  be  well  to  observe  that  the  strange  and 
absurd  proposition  is  advanced  that  the  non-Russian  Republics  are  not 
capable  of  governing  themselves  but  that  Russia  is  capable  of  governing 
them.  A  moment's  reflection  will  demonstrate  the  fallacy  and  the 
absurdity  of  this  contention.  Russia  is  worse  than  a  broken  reed.  The 
poor  old  Russian  ship  of  state  is  a  mass  of  wreckage  swept  by  every 
storm  and  tossed  ruthlessly  by  every  wave.  On  the  other  hand,  the  little 
Republics  have  stable  Governments,  organized  along  constitutional  lines 
of  right  and  freedom,  and  sustained  by  well-disciplined  armies  that 
have  beaten  back  bolshevism  from  their  territories  and  that  stand  today 
as  breakwaters  against  a  great  tide  of  anarchy  and  ignorance.  Can  it 
be  seriously  contended  that  these  little  well-ordered  States  can  not  govern 
themselves,  but  that  Russia  can  govern  them? 

The  Russian  Problem. 

Of  course,  it  is  nothing  but  fair  to  state  that  the  advocates  of  a 
greater  Russia  contend  that  a  stable  government  can  be  established  out 
of  the  ruins  of  the  present  Russia,  and  that  it  might  be  well  to  leave 


63 

Esthonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania  as  political  units  or  national  members 
of  this  greater  Russia.  Such  a  proposition  is  neither  fair,  feasible,  nor 
just.  Neither  the  wisdom  of  the  philosopher  nor  the  vision  of  the 
prophet  can  tell  what  will  be  the  result  of  government  in  Russia  in  the 
next  generation  or  century.  The  return  of  the  Czar  and  of  absolutism 
is  unthinkable,  and  is  seriously  contemplated  by  nobody  except  the 
interested  Russian  aristocracy.  But  whether  a  constitutional  monarchy, 
a  federative  republic,  or  several  independent  republics,  for  the  territory 
of  the  ancient  Russian  Empire,  is  a  question  for  debate.  Each  has  its 
advocates,  and  one  of  them  must  be  a  solution  of  the  Russian  problem. 

A  Constitutional  Monarchy  ? 

A  constitutional  monarchy  is  not  practicable  or  advisable  for 
Russia.  The  history  of  England  shows  that  years  and  generations  were 
required  to  determine  whether  a  given  race  of  people,  endowed  with 
certain  national  and  individual  attributes,  are  capable  of  self-govern- 
ment under  a  liberal  monarchy.  The  first  Englishmen  of  more  than  a 
thousand  years  ago  were  probably  more  intelligent  and  conservative 
and  adapted  to  self-government  than  are  the  Russians  of  today,  and  yet 
it  took  all  these  years  of  painful  development,  with  all  the  strange 
vicissitudes  of  British  history,  such  as  the  contest  of  the  Barons  with 
King  John  over  Magna  Charta,  the  beheading  of  King  Charles,  and  the 
establishment  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Cromwell,  to  bring  England  to 
her  present  proud  station  as  the  leading  monarchial  democratic  Com- 
monwealth of  the  world. 

A  Federative  Republic  ? 

A  federative  republic  is  out  of  the  question,  as  a  conference  of 
Russians  at  Petrograd,  under  the  Kerensky  regime,  admitted.  A  republic 
of  any  kind,  to  be  worthy  of  the  name,  must  of  necessity  rest  upon  the 
will  of  the  people  and  be  controlled  by  the  action  of  the  majority. 
Russia  proper  has  130,000,000  of  the  180,000,000  people  of  the  former 
Russian  Empire.  This  vast  majority  is  densely  illiterate  and  can  not 
justly  rule  the  intelligent,  literate  non-Russian  minority.  If  England, 
France,  the  United  States,  or  some  other  masterful  and  intelligent  nation 
could  be  placed  where  great  Russia  is,  a  federative  republic  might  be 
possible,  since  the  dominating  race  would  then  form  the  intelligent  head 
of  a  confederacy  of  peoples  of  different  races  and  religions.  The  United 
States,  Great  Britain,  and  France  illustrate  this  truth  in  their  govern- 
ments today.  But  it  is  inconceivable  to  think  that  great  Russia  could 
govern  a  federative  republic  where  the  non-Russian  members  of  the 
confederation  would  form  the  only  intelligent  and  educated  elements. 


64 

The  Russians  ruled  the  empire  of  the  Czar  on  principles  and  under  terms 
of  absolutism,  and  not  upon  the  principles  of  freedom  and  democracy, 
such  as  the  existence  of  a  republic  necessarily  implies. 


American  Federation. 

Besides,  our  American  experiment  throws  serious  doubt  upon  the 
advisability  of  a  federative  republic  for  Russia.  In  America,  after  seven 
years  and  eight  months  of  bitter  struggle,  we  gained  our  independence; 
but  from  the  surrender  of  Cornwallis  at  Yorktown  to  the  adoption  of 
our  Constitution  at  Philadelphia  in  1787  was  a  period  of  six  years,  and 
then  it  required  more  than  half  a  century,  until  the  close  of  our  Civil 
War  in  1865,  to  determine  whether  free  government  under  a  federative 
republic  in  America  were  possible.  And  I  respectfully  submit  that 
Americans  in  every  age,  besides  being  homogeneous  in  race,  language, 
and  religion,  and  contiguous  in  territory,  have  been  more  intelligent, 
conservative  and  literate  than  are  the  Russians  of  today. 


When  Will  Russia  Come  Back? 

To  suppose  that  Russia  can  develop  in  a  generation  a  stable  form 
of  government  is  to  fly  in  the  face  of  the  facts  and  teachings  of  history. 
The  illiteracy  and  the  emotional  and  idealistic  tendencies  of  the  Russian 
mind  will  make  Russians  for  many  years  to  come  a  bufi'et  and  a  prey  of 
every  fanatic  like  Lenin  and  every  demagogue  like  Trotsky  that  may 
come  along. 


Baltic  States  Should  be  Recognized. 

Should  the  rights  of  the  intelligent,  well-organized,  non-Russian  Re- 
publics to  self-determination  and  independence  be  made  contingent 
upon  the  speculative  proposition  of  the  establishment  of  a  stable  govern- 
ment in  Russia  any  time  within  the  next  few  years?  I  think  not.  Justice 
requires  that  these  little  countries  be  immediately  recognized  and  ad- 
mitted to  the  League  of  Nations  or  otherwise  protected  by  an  alliance 
of  nations,  with  the  understanding  that  they  are  to  perform  all  their 
obligations  under  the  league  or  alliance,  including  the  maintenance  of 
friendly  relations  with  all  mankind,  and  especially  with  their  immediate 
surrounding  neighbors,  and  that  they  shall  then  have  the  protection  of 
the  league  or  alliance  of  nations  against  the  aggressors  of  all  mankind, 
particularly  against  Germany  and  Russia. 


65 

The  Baltic  Land  Question. 

The  Baltic  baron  land  question  is  acute,  and  in  the  minds  of  many 
forms  a  serious  objection  in  connection  with  the  consideration  of  the 
question  of  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Esthonia  and  Latvia. 
Some  700  years  ago  Germans  invaded  Esthonia  and  Latvia,  conquered 
the  land  by  force  of  arms,  and  made  serfs  of  the  people,  as  William  the 
Conqueror  invaded  England  in  1066  and  made  serfs  and  churls  of  the 
Saxons.  The  Esthonians  and  Letts  have  never  ceased  to  hope  that  they 
would  some  day  regain  their  freedom  and  their  lands.  The  defeat  of 
Germany  and  the  destruction  of  the  Empire  of  the  Czar  removed  from 
Europe  and  from  history  the  two  great  oppressors  of  Esthonians  and 
Letts.  Since  the  establishment  of  the  Esthonian  and  Lettish  Republics, 
several  Esthonian  and  Lettish  statesmen,  as  well  as  certain  statesmen  in 
other  European  countries,  have  contended  that  these  lands  that  were 
virtually  stolen  from  their  countrymen  by  highway  robbers  700  years 
ago  should  now  be  taken  back  by  confiscation,  since  no  legal  title  was 
ever  vested  in  the  usurpers  upon  these  lands.  But  it  seems  that  a  dif- 
ferent course  is  now  being  pursued  by  the  Esthonian  and  Lettish  national 
assemblies,  out  of  respect  to  the  opinions  and  wishes  of  America  and  of 
the  Allies,  and  that  some  form  of  compensation  will  be  given  to  the 
Baltic  barons  for  their  lands,  leaving  to  them  a  portion  of  the  lands  also, 
regardless  of  the  methods  by  which  they  were  acquired  in  the  beginning. 
I  have  just  been  informed  by  Mr.  Louis  Seya,  representative  of  Latvia, 
who  has  just  arrived  in  America,  that  this  is  the  attitude  of  his  Govern- 
ment at  the  present  time. 

An  Internal  Question. 

The  settlement  of  this  problem,  however,  should  not  be  final  or 
decisive  in  the  matter  of  the  determination  of  the  rights  of  Esthonia  and 
Latvia.  The  disposition  of  this  question  is  really  an  internal  affair,  and 
if  our  Government  can  not  intervene  in  Russia  to  protect  the  land  of  the 
Russian  nobility  against  confiscation  by  Trotski  and  Lenin,  if  it  is  not 
regarded  as  worth  while  to  object  to  the  confiscation  of  the  lands  and 
properties  of  the  Austrian  nobility  by  the  Czecho-Slovaks,  and  having  as 
an  example  the  practical  confiscation  of  church  properties  in  France 
not  many  years  ago,  against  which  no  civilized  nation  protested  at  the 
time,  I  respectfully  submit  that  the  little  Republics  of  Esthonia  and 
Latvia  should  not  be  made  a  special  example  in  this  regard. 

These  little  States  have  met  every  possible  objection  to  their  claims 
to  independence.  They  agree  to  pay  their  proportionate  share  of  the 
Russian  prewar  debt,  to  allow  neutral  countries,  or  the  League  of  Nations, 
in  conference  with  their  own  representatives,  to  determine  the  amount, 


66 

and  to  pledge  their  natural  resources  and  future  revenues  for  the  pay- 
ment. 

The  Baltic  Ports. 

The  advocates  of  a  reunited  Russia  insist  that  the  independence  of 
Latvia,  Esthonia,  and  Lithuania  would  practically  shut  out  Great  Russia 
from  the  Raltic  Sea  and  from  free  commerce  with  the  western  woild. 
These  gentlemen  contend  that  the  absolute  independence  of  these  States, 
considering  their  small  territory  and  geographical  location,  would  be 
a  constant  menace  to  the  peace  of  the  world,  because  of  the  supreme 
necessities  of  Russian  industrial  and  commercial  life,  and  that  their  re- 
conquest  by  some  Charles  XII  or  Peter  the  Great  would  be  only  a 
matter  of  time  and  provocation  and  circumstance  in  history. 

The  answer  to  this  objection  is  that  the  Baltic  States  have  all 
repeatedly  proposed  to  the  peace  conference  at  Paris,  and  at  other  times 
to  the  representatives  of  different  nations,  to  keep  their  ports  on  the 
Baltic  open  to  the  Russians  under  fair  and  equitable  conditions  of  port 
duties  and  customs  charges;  also  to  guarantee  to  the  Russians  equitable 
railway  transit  across  their  territories,  thus  furnishing  fair  and  unob- 
structed passage  from  Russia  to  the  open  sea.  In  the  various  treaties 
they  have  made  with  soviet  Russia  they  have  already  acted  and  are  now 
acting  in  good  faith  in  the  proposals  they  have  made  in  this  regard. 

Dismemberment  of  Russia. 

Again,  certain  objectors  to  the  independence  of  the  Baltic  States 
have  urged  that  legally,  under  international  law,  the  allied  nations  can 
not  recognize  them  as  independent  governments.  It  is  contended  that 
the  doctrine  of  self-determination  was  and  is  intended  to  apply  only 
to  the  enemy  countries,  namely,  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria, 
and  Turkey,  and  that  the  application  of  the  principle  to  former  Russian 
Provinces  would  be  a  virtual  dismemberment  of  the  territory  of  a 
friendly  country. 

The  first  reply  to  this  contention  is  that  Russia  has  never  been  in 
any  proper  sense  a  friendly  country  since  the  last  days  of  the  Kerensky 
regime. 

In  the  second  place,  reply  should  be  made  that  the  principle  of  self- 
determination,  if  just  and  righteous  in  any  case,  should  be  applied  in  all 
cases  where  the  elements  forming  the  necessary  basis  of  self-determina- 
tion are  present.  Certainly  a  just  and  righteous  principle  of  government 
should  not  be  employed  as  an  instrument  of  punishment  or  revenge  by 
being  applied  alone  to  enemy  countries.  It  is  ironically  cruel  to  deny 
to  friends  the  benefits  that  enemies  enjoy. 


67 

Dismemberment  an  Accomplished  Fact. 

In  the  third  place,  it  may  be  replied  that  Russia  has  already  been 
dismembered  by  both  Russians  and  the  Allies.  In  the  Brest-Litovsk 
treaty  the  bolshevik  rulers  of  Russia  practically  ceded  all  the  Baltic 
Provinces  to  Germany,  and  subsequently  by  complementary  agreements 
at  Berlin  in  the  summer  of  1918  completed  the  cession  by  waiving  all 
rights  of  sovereignty  of  any  kind  over  these  western  Russian  States.  The 
fact  that  the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  has  since  been  repudiated  by  the 
Allies  and  has  been  canceled  by  Germany  does  not  alter  the  fact  that 
Russia  was  dismembered  by  Russians  themselves. 

Finland,  Poland,  Armenia. 

Again,  in  the  acknowledgement  of  the  independence  of  Finland, 
the  Allies  themselves  have  particularly  dismembered  Russia.  This  dis- 
memberment was  further  carried  out  by  the  acknowledgement  of  the 
independence  of  Russian  Poland, Russian  Armenia,  and  by  the  separation 
and  cession  of  Bessarabia.  The  contention  has  been  made  that  these 
were  exceptions  and  were  not  intended  as  precedents,  but  the  fact  of 
dismemberment  remains  nevertheless,  and  the  precedents  aje  there 
regardless  of  the  intention. 

Treaties  With  Russia. 

The  various  recent  treaties  between  the  soviet  government  and  the 
Governments  of  the  Baltic  Republics  by  which  the  bolsheviki  have 
formally  and  solemnly  acknowledged  the  independence  of  the  little 
countries  is  the  best  possible  proof  of  the  willingness  of  the  bolsheviki 
to  dismember  Russia.  And  not  only  the  Russians  under  Lenin  and 
Trotski  but  Russians  who  are  not  bolsheviki  have  also  consented.  I 
personally  saw  Gen.  Yudenitch,  commander  of  the  Russian  Army  on  the 
north-western  front,  sign  an  agreement  to  acknowledge  the  independent 
of  Esthonia.  Conditions  were  attached,  however,  to  the  agreement  which 
rendered  it  impossible  for  the  Esthonians  to  accept.  Nevertheless,  the 
fact  of  the  willingness  of  the  leader  of  one  of  the  non-bolshevik  Russian 
armies  to  acknowledge  the  independence  of  Esthonia  and  thereby  dis- 
member the  Russian  Empire  remains. 

Supreme  Council's  Action. 

Permit  me  to  say,  in  conclusion,  if  you  please,  that  all  discussion  of 
the  dismemberment  of  Russia  in  the  future  will  be  worse  than  idle 
talk.  The  Russian  Empire  has  been  recently  definitely  and  irrevocably 
dismembered  by  the  allied  powers  at  Paris  when  they  acknowledged 


68 

the  independence  de  jure  of  Esthonia  and  Latvia,  and  intimated  that 
they  would  acknowledge  the  independence  de  jure  of  Lithuania  as  soon 
as  the  Polish  frontier  question  had  been  settled.  The  brave  little  Re- 
publics of  the  Baltic  Sea  are  now  free  and  independent  States  and 
members  in  good  standing  of  the  great  family  of  nations.  Their 
sovereignty  has  been  established  and  decreed  by  all  the  great  Govern- 
ments of  the  world  excepting  our  own.  The  recognition  of  their  inde- 
pendence was  de  jure,  not  de  facto — absolute,  not  conditional — and  they 
will  remain  forever  free  until  they  waive  and  surrender  their  sovereignty 
by  treaty  stipulations  or  until  they  are  overrun  by  some  conqueror  who 
robs  them  of  their  freedom.  Neither  one  of  these  contingencies  is  to 
be  thought  of  at  this  time. 

I  am  well  aware  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  is  not 
necessarily  bound  by  the  action  of  other  Governments  in  this  regard. 
But  I  respectfully  suggest  that  a  decent  respect  for  the  opinions  of  man- 
kind, a  proper  spirit  of  international  comity,  and  a  due  appreciation 
of  the  action  of  other  Governments,  should  impel  us  to  follow  immedi- 
ately the  example  of  other  nations  and  to  recognize  at  once  the  inde- 
pendence absolute  of  Esthonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania. 


Briand's  Recognition  of  Latvia. 

When  Aristide  Briand  sent  official  notification  of  the  recognition  of 
Latvia  to  the  president  of  the  Latvian  delegation  at  Paris  he  used  this 
language : 

"The  supreme  council  of  the  allied  powers,  taking  into 
consideration  the  repeated  requests  presented  by  your  Govern- 
ment, has  decided  at  its  session  of  today  to  recognize  Latvia  as 
a  de  jure  State. 

"The  powers  desire  to  mark  by  this  the  sympathy  which 
they  feel  toward  the  Latvian  people  and  to  render  homage  to 
what  it  has  accomplished  in  the  establishment  of  order  and 
peace  in  its  national  life." 

The  suggestion  of  the  "establishment  of  order  and  peace"  as  the 
reason  of  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Latvia  is  full  of  mean- 
ing and  is  a  direct  and  powerful  appeal  to  us  for  our  official  recognition. 
With  the  fall  of  the  Russian  Empire  and  the  establishment  of  the  soviet 
government  a  supreme  crisis  confronted  Latvia  and  the  other  Baltic 
States.  The  alternative  of  following  Russia  into  bolshevism  and  anarchy 
or  of  standing  with  the  civilized  nations  of  the  world  for  the  maintenance 
of  law  and  order  presented  itself.    There  was  no  hesitation  in  deciding. 


«0 

Baltic  States  Fought  Bolsheviki. 

The  brave  little  Republics  at  once  scornfully  and  defiantly  repudi- 
ated Lenin  and  Trotski  and  all  their  teachings  and  practices,  and  allied 
themselves  with  the  antibolshevik  peoples  of  the  earth.  And  from  the 
very  first  there  has  been  no  change  of  resolution,  no  wavering,  no  retreat. 
Bravely,  steadfastly,  and  with  sublime  purpose  and  resolve  they  have 
borne  the  brunt  of  battle  against  the  hordes  of  anai-chy  in  Russia.  While 
university  professors  throughout  the  world  were  learnedly  discussing 
bolshevik  theories  in  the  quiet  and  seclusion  of  academic  shades,  and 
while  statesmen  of  Rome,  Paris,  London,  and  Washington  have  been 
loudly  denouncing  Lenin  and  Trotski  from  afar,  the  brave  soldiers  of 
Esthonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania  have  been  engaged  in  a  death  struggle 
at  close  quarters  with  the  Red  armies  of  Russia. 

Do  these  sufferings  and  sacrifices  deserve  no  recognition,  no  reward? 
Is  it  without  meaning  that  men  and  women  and  children  should  starve 
and  wear  rags  and  die  for  others?  Men  and  women  and  children  have 
starved  and  worn  rags  and  died  rather  than  accept  bolshevik  favors 
or  submit  to  bolshevik  rule. 


•>>. 


Esthonian  Soldiers. 

In  the  summer  of  1919  I  visited  Esthonia.  Through  Gen.  Toennison, 
their  commander,  as  interpreter,  I  addressed  the  various  units  of  the 
Esthonian  Army.  While  I  was  speaking  the  soldiers  were  standing  at 
rigid  salute.  Many  of  them  were  boys  not  more  than  15  years  of  age. 
Though  young  in  years,  their  sufferings  and  sacrifices  had  given  them 
faces  and  features  that  looked  bronzed  and  granite  like.  From  each 
eye  a  glint  of  desperation  and  defiance  gleamed  fiercely  when  they  looked 
across  their  barbed-wire  entanglements  toward  the  bolshevik  battle  line 
a  few  miles  away.  Most  of  these  brave  fellows  were  poorly  clad  and 
barefooted.  I  assured  them  that  the  greatest  Republic  in  the  world,  my 
own  country,  had  been  founded  by  barefooted  soldiers  who  left  blood 
prints  upon  the  snows  at  Valley  Forge.  I  told  them  that  I  saw  in  them 
the  resurrected,  the  reincarnated  soldiers  of  Valley  Forge,  and  that  I 
would  never  cease  pleading  their  cause  until  their  country  was  as  free 
and  independent  as  mine.  And  I  am  here  today  to  fulfill  that  pledge, 
not  only  to  Esthonians  but  to  others  as  well,  to  Letts  and  Lffhuanians 
who  are  equally  brave  and  self-sacrificing  as  Esthonians. 

Recognition  is  a  Duty. 

I  respectfully  submit  that  a  sacred  and  solemn  duty  rests  upon  the 
United  States  to  recognize  at  once  the  independence  de  jure  of  Esthonia, 
Latvia,  and  Lithuania.    They  merit  our  recognition  and  our  good  will, 


70 

our  sympathy,  and  our  support.    They  merit  the  recognition  and  good 
will  and  sympathy  and  support  of  all  civilized  mankind. 

Their  people  are  literate,  their  statesmen  are  able  and  accomplished, 
and  their  soldiers  are  brave  and  unconquerable.  These  are  the  real 
attributes  of  sovereignty  and  the  right  to  be  free  and  independent,  for, 
after  all,  the  permanency  and  prosperity  of  nations  depend  upon  the 
wisdom  of  the  statesmen  who  conceive  the  constitution  and  create  the 
laws,  upon  the  patriotism  and  intelligence  of  the  people  who  make  and 
support  the  government,  and  upon  the  courage  of  soldiers  who  defend 
the  national  frontiers.  All  these  things  are  pre-eminently  present  in 
the  life,  character,  history,  and  civilization  of  the  Baltic  Republics  of 
Esthonia,  Latvia,  and  Lithuania,  the  recognition  of  whose  independence 
as  free  and  independent  States  I  advocate  today. 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 

AN  INITIAL  FINE  OF  25  CENTS 

WILL   BE   ASSESSED    FOR   FAILURE  TO   RETURN 
THIS    BOOK   ON    THE   DATE   DUE.    THE   PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  SO  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY     AND     TO     $1.00     ON     THE    SEVENTH     DAY 
OVERDUE. 

AUG  1 3  1982 

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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  UBRARY 


